6 ideas
| 22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
| Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4 | |
| A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view. |
| 21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 21004 | Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Bentham saw rights as a 'child of law', Herbert Hart's view takes the form of seeing human rights as, in effect, 'parents of law'; they motivate specific legislations. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hart 1955 'Are there any natural rights?'] I agree with Hart. It is clearer if the parents of law are not referred to as 'rights'. You can demand a right, but it is only a right when it is awarded to you. |
| 20932 | Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Hart says we have secondary legal 'rules of recognition', by which primary positive law is recognised and applied in a regulated manner. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Rules' | |
| A reaction: The example of the authority of a particular court is given. |
| 20931 | Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Hart replaced Austin's concept of positive law as sovereign command with a more democratic ideal. In modern law-based societies the authority of law depends on the people's acceptance of a law's enduring validity. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Hart' | |
| A reaction: Presumably the ancestor of this view is the social contract of Hobbes and Locke. |