8 ideas
22361 | Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
Full Idea: Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory. | |
From: report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2 | |
A reaction: This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good! |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718) | |
A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'. |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent. | |
From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties. |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716) | |
A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality. |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8) | |
A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715) | |
A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps. |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717) | |
A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals. |