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13099
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Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
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A reaction:
Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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8404
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Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
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8401
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Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
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A reaction:
All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
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8402
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The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
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A reaction:
This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).
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