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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd)' and 'On Multiplying Entities'

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35 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
     Full Idea: It is the quest for system and simplicity that has kept driving the scientist to posit further entities as values of his variables. By positing molecules, Boyles' law of gases could be assimilated into a general theory of bodies in motion.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: Interesting that a desire for simplicity might lead to multiplications of entities. In fact, I presume molecules had been proposed elsewhere in science, and were adopted in gas-theory because they were thought to exist, not because simplicity is nice.
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
     Full Idea: In classical arithmetic, ratios were posited to make division generally applicable, negative numbers to make subtraction generally applicable, and irrationals and finally imaginaries to make exponentiation generally applicable.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.263)
     A reaction: This is part of Quine's proposal (c.f. Idea 8207) that entities have to be multiplied in order to produce simplicity. He is speculating. Maybe they are proposed because they are just obvious, and the generality is a nice side-effect.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Until the 1960s standard truth-table semantics were the only ones that there were.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.10.1)
     A reaction: The 1960s presumably marked the advent of possible worlds.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that have that relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs on either side of the relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that are related to by the first objects.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
     Full Idea: We write F : A → B to indicate that A maps into B, that is, the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B. If we add that F = B, then A maps 'onto' B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
     Full Idea: F(x) is a 'function', which indicates the unique value which y takes in ∈ F. That is, F(x) is the value y which F assumes at x.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair in the set has the relation in both directions.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'transitive' on a set if the relation can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set. Thus: PA = {x : x ⊆ A}.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty (i.e. they have no members in common).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The 'domain' of a relation is the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs that are members of the relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs. The ordering relation on the numbers 0-3 is captured by - in fact it is - the set of ordered pairs {<0,1>,<0,2>,<0,3>,<1,2>,<1,3>,<2,3>}.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
     A reaction: This can't quite be a definition of order among numbers, since it relies on the notion of a 'ordered' pair.
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A 'function' is a relation which is single-valued. That is, for each object, there is only one object in the function set to which that object is related.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A function 'maps A into B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A function 'maps A onto B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are set B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member of the set bears the relation to itself.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' on a set if every ordered pair is related (in either direction), or the objects are identical.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: An 'equivalence relation' is a binary relation which is reflexive, and symmetric, and transitive.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Equivalence classes will 'partition' a set. That is, it will divide it into distinct subsets, according to each relation on the set.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The process is dubbed 'conversational implicature' when the inference is not from the content of what has been said, but from the fact that it has been said.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7.3)
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The point of logic is to give an account of the notion of validity,..in two standard ways: the semantic way says that a valid inference preserves truth (symbol |=), and the proof-theoretic way is defined in terms of purely formal procedures (symbol |-).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.3..)
     A reaction: This division can be mirrored in mathematics, where it is either to do with counting or theorising about things in the physical world, or following sets of rules from axioms. Language can discuss reality, or play word-games.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A is a logical truth (tautology) (|= A) iff it is a semantic consequence of the empty set of premises (φ |= A), that is, every interpretation makes A true.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.3.4)
     A reaction: So the final column of every line of the truth table will be T.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A truth assignment 'satisfies' a formula, or set of formulae, if it evaluates as True when all of its components have been assigned truth values.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.2)
     A reaction: [very roughly what Enderton says!] The concept becomes most significant when a large set of wff's is pronounced 'satisfied' after a truth assignment leads to them all being true.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If every proof-theoretically valid inference is semantically valid (so that |- entails |=), the proof theory is said to be 'sound'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If every semantically valid inference is proof-theoretically valid (so that |= entails |-), the proof-theory is said to be 'complete'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If a wff is tautologically implied by a set of wff's, it is implied by a finite subset of them; and if every finite subset is satisfiable, then so is the whole set of wff's.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5)
     A reaction: [Enderton's account is more symbolic] He adds that this also applies to models. It is a 'theorem' because it can be proved. It is a major theorem in logic, because it brings the infinite under control, and who doesn't want that?
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A set of expressions is 'decidable' iff there exists an effective procedure (qv) that, given some expression, will decide whether or not the expression is included in the set (i.e. doesn't contradict it).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: This is obviously a highly desirable feature for a really reliable system of expressions to possess. All finite sets are decidable, but some infinite sets are not.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The Enumerability Theorem says that for a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can be effectively enumerated.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5)
     A reaction: There are criteria for what makes a 'reasonable' language (probably specified to ensure enumerability!). Predicates and functions must be decidable, and the language must be finite.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine]
     Full Idea: An account of events just in terms of physical bodies does not distinguish between events that happen to take up just the same portion of space-time. A man's whistling and walking would be identified with the same temporal segment of the man.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.260)
     A reaction: We wouldn't want to make his 'walking' and his 'strolling' two events. Whistling and walking are different because different objects are involved (lips and legs). Hence a man is not (ontologically) a single object.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine]
     Full Idea: The need to add a note of necessity to 'all black crows are black' could be met by a generalisation over classes (what belongs to sets x and y belongs to y), or maybe be quantifying over possible particulars.
     From: Willard Quine (On Multiplying Entities [1974], p.262)
     A reaction: He dislikes the second strategy because 'unactualized particulars are an obscure and troublesome lot'. The second is the strategy of Lewis. I think necessity starts to creep back in as soon as you ask WHY a generalisation holds true.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Not all sentences using 'if' are conditionals. Consider 'if you want a banana, there is one in the kitchen'. The rough test is that a conditional can be rewritten as 'that A implies that B'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.6.4)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').