Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Symbolic Reasoning' and 'Apprehension: reason in absence of Rules'

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3 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null class is the class with all the non-existents as its members [MacColl, by Lackey]
     Full Idea: In 1905 the Scottish logician Hugh MacColl published a paper in which he argued that the null class in logic should be taken as the class with all the non-existents as its members.
     From: report of Hugh MacColl (Symbolic Reasoning [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.95
     A reaction: For the null object (zero) Frege just chose one sample concept with an empty extension. MacColl's set seems to have a lot of members, given that it is 'null'. How many, I wonder? Russell responded to this paper.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Apprehension is a complex intellect grasping the essence of a complex object [Holt,L]
     Full Idea: The paradigm case of apprehension is of a complex intellect confronted with a complex object, in which the intellect understands in a particular context what is 'essential' about the object.
     From: Lynn Holt (Apprehension: reason in absence of Rules [2002], 3 'Expertise')
     A reaction: My line is that this apprehension cashes out as an immediate ability to explain the object. This is an enhanced version of the rational understanding of things found in most larger animals. Holt says her account is Aristotelian.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').