28 ideas
23064 | So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What is known as 'wisdom' is ultimately only a perpetual 'thinking it over', i.e. non-action as first impulse. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: This may be how most people view wisdom. Wisdom is for the spectators, not the actors (perhaps). Wisdom needs a lot of thought, and I don't associate it with extremely active people. |
23072 | Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel - three enslavers of the mind. The worst form of despotism is the system, in philosophy and in everything. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 07) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear why intellectual 'despotism' is a dreadful crime. I revere Aristotle, partly because he is systematic, but I reject about 30% of what he says. Still, many people agree with this idea. |
23075 | A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Why embroider upon what excludes commentary? A text explained is not longer a text. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: I like that. I'm not a great fan of explicating texts, especially if they are literary, where the whole point is the primary experience, of a novel, poem or play. Philosophy is different, because that is a dialogue between writer and reader. |
23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Negation never proceeds from reasoning but from something much more obscure and old. Arguments come afterward, to justify and sustain it. Every no rises out of the blood. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. In the Fregean era no one is allowed to talk about the origins of logical relations in the universal facts of physical existence. You can watch dogs saying no. |
23077 | The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Whether it is spoken by a grocer or a philosopher, the word 'being', apparently so rich, so tempting, so charged with significance, in fact means nothing at all; incredible that a man in his right mind can use it on any occasion whatever. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 12) | |
A reaction: I entirely agree. It resembles the redundancy view of 'true' (with which I do not agree). |
23068 | People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: When you know quite absolutely that everything is unreal, you then cannot see why you should take the trouble to prove it. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: Does the same apply to realists? There are at least genuine arguments in both directions. Presumably the thought is that realists have something they care about, but true anti-realists don't. |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
Full Idea: McFetridge's conception of logical necessity is one which sees the concept as receiving its fundamental exemplification in the connection between the premiss and conclusion of a deductively valid inference. | |
From: report of Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986]) by Bob Hale - Absolute Necessities 2 | |
A reaction: This would mean that p could be logically necessary but false (if it was a valid argument from false premisses). What if it was a valid inference in a dodgy logical system (including 'tonk', for example)? |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
Full Idea: McFetridge's view proves that if the conditional corresponding to a valid inference is logically necessary, then there is no sense in which it is possible that its antecedent be true but its consequent false. ..This result generalises to any statement. | |
From: report of Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986]) by Bob Hale - Absolute Necessities 2 | |
A reaction: I am becoming puzzled by Hale's assertion that logical necessity is 'absolute', while resting his case on a conditional. Are we interested in the necessity of the inference, or the necessity of the consequent? |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: There will be a legitimate notion of 'logical' necessity only if there is a notion of necessity which attaches to the claim, concerning a deductively valid argument, that if the premisses are true then so is the conclusion. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1) | |
A reaction: He quotes Aristotle's Idea 11148 in support. Is this resting a stronger idea on a weaker one? Or is it the wrong way round? We endorse validity because we see the necessity; we don't endorse necessity because we see 'validity'. |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: If it is logically necessary that if p then q, then there is no other sense of 'necessary' in which it is not necessary that if p then q. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1) | |
A reaction: The thesis which McFetridge proposes to defend. The obvious rival would be metaphysical necessity, and the rival claim would presumably be that things are only logically necessary if that is entailed by a metaphysical necessity. Metaphysics drives logic. |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: The traditional crucial assumption is that logical necessity is the strongest notion of necessity. If it is logically necessary that p, then it is necessary that p in any other use of the notion of necessity there may be (physically, practically etc.). | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. We might say it is physically necessary simply because it is logically necessary, and even that it is metaphysically necessary because it is logically necessary (required by logic). Logical possibility is hence the weakest kind? |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Is there any sense in which, despite an ascription of necessity to p, it is held that not-p is possible? If there is, then the original claim then it was necessary is not a claim of 'logical' necessity (which is the strongest necessity). | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12181, which leads up to this proposed "test" for logical necessity. McFetridge has already put epistemic ('for all I know') possibility to one side. □p→¬◊¬p is the standard reading of necessity. His word 'sense' bears the burden. |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: The manifestation of the belief that a mode of inference is logically necessarily truth-preserving is the preparedness to employ that mode of inference in reasoning from any set of suppositions whatsoever. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §4) | |
A reaction: He rests this on the idea of 'cotenability' of the two sides of a counterfactual (in Mill, Goodman and Lewis). There seems, at first blush, to be a problem of the relevance of the presuppositions. |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: Time- and person-relative epistemic possibility can be asserted even when logical possibility cannot, such as undecided mathematical propositions. 'It may be that p' just comes to 'For all I know, not-p'. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1) | |
A reaction: If it is possible 'for all I know', then it could be actual for all I know, and if we accept that it might be actual, we could hardly deny that it is logically possible. Logical and epistemic possibilities of mathematical p stand or fall together. |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: The 'objectual modal realist' holds that what makes modal beliefs true are certain modal objects, typically 'possible worlds'. ..The 'non-objectual modal realist' says modal judgements are made true by how things stand with respect to this world. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §2) | |
A reaction: I am an enthusiastic 'non-objectual modal realist'. I accept the argument that real possible worlds have no relevance to the actual world, and explain nothing (see Jubien). The possibilities reside in the 'powers' of this world. See Molnar on powers. |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
Full Idea: The 'modal realist' holds that part of the totality of what is the case, the totality of facts, are such things as that certain events could have happened, certain propositions are necessarily true, if this happened then that would have been the case. | |
From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §2) | |
A reaction: I am an enthusiastic modal realist. If the aim of philosophy is 'to understand' (and I take that to be the master idea of the subject) then no understanding is possible which excludes the possibilities and necessities in things. |
23078 | Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran] |
Full Idea: To have opinions is inevitable, is natural; to have convictions is less so. Each time I meet someone who has convictions, I wonder what intellectual vice, what flaw has caused him to acquire such a thing. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 12) | |
A reaction: 'The best lack all conviction/ While the worst are full of passionate intensity' (Yeats). I agree with this. Convictions are so often accompanied by anger. |
23073 | Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran] |
Full Idea: We have convictions only if we have studied nothing thoroughly. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 08) | |
A reaction: Excellent! I cannot imagine studying anything at all in great depth without it resulting in a dwindling expectation of full understanding. Philosophy in spades, but also probably any topic in history. |
23076 | If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is because of speech that men give the illusion of being free. If they did - without a word - what they do, we would take them for robots. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: Love this one. Though it might be said that the power of speech does add an extra dimension of freedom to an action, beyond what any animal could attain. I take the absolute idea of 'being free' to be nonsense. |
23065 | If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: If only we could reach back before the concept, could write on a level with the senses, record the infinitesimal variations of what we touch, do what a reptile would do if it were to set about writing! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: A lovely thought. It is a huge effort for us to try to imagine a mental life without concepts. And then to express that mental life in words…..! |
23071 | We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The problem of responsibility would have a meaning only if we had been consulted before our birth and had consented to be precisely who we are. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 06) | |
A reaction: The question could still be asked retrospectively, like agreeing to be in an army into which you have been conscripted. People gripped by deeply anti-social desires would probably welcome the chance to become different. |
23070 | We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Moral disintegration when we spend time in a place that is too beautiful: the self dissolves upon contact with paradise. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 06) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure whether that is true, but it is worth thinking about the value of experiences which are overwhelming. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
23074 | In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran] |
Full Idea: In anxiety, a man clings to whatever can reinforce, can stimulate his providential discomfort: to try to cure him of it is to destroy his equilibrium, anxiety being the basis of his existence and his prosperity. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09) | |
A reaction: A report from the front line of the age of anxiety, on which I am not qualified to comment. I assume that some anxiety can be a good thing, like nerves before a public performance. |
23062 | It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I do nothing, granted. But I see the hours pass - which is better than trying to fill them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: As Nietzsche would have pointed out, this came from a man who regularly wrote books. It is, though, certainly worth asking whether the way we fill our time is better than doing nothing. |
23069 | Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Fear is the antidote to boredom: the remedy must be stronger than the disease. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 05) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is the motivation of people who indulge in dangerous sports. Maybe all that is need is something daunting, rather than frightening. |
23067 | Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It's not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 02) | |
A reaction: A neat thought, but unlikely to be true for those who commit suicide, which presumably results from a sustained and apparently incurable situation. |
23063 | The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Paradise was unendurable, otherwise the first man would have adapted to it. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 01) | |
A reaction: Seems a bit harsh. There was evidently one aspect that was missing (knowledge), and he was surprised to find himself ejected for wanting it. Like a holiday in a Mediterranean hotel, with good food. |