Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge' and 'Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers

18487	We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
	Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.
	From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
	A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

18488	We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
	Full Idea: If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'.
	From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
	A reaction: Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised).

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds

9220	Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
	Full Idea: If purple cows are simply absent from Lewis's multiverse, then certain correct propositions turn out to be impossible. Lewis must require a world for every possibility. But then it is circular, as the multiverse needs modal notions to characterize it.
	From: report of Scott Shalkowski (Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality [1994], 3.9) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.9
	A reaction: [Inversely, a world containing a round square would make that possible] This sounds very nice, though Sider rejects it (p.197). I've never seen how you could define possibility using the concept of 'possible' worlds.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').