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All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge' and 'Reductive Theories of Modality'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider]
     Full Idea: According to one tradition, necessary truth demarcates philosophical from empirical inquiry. Science identifies contingent aspects of the world, whereas philosophical inquiry reveals the essential nature of its objects.
     From: Theodore Sider (Reductive Theories of Modality [2003], 1)
     A reaction: I don't think there is a clear demarcation, and I would think that lots of generalizations about contingent truths are in philosophical territory, but I quite like this idea - even if it does make scientists laugh at philosophers.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
     A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: If one were asked 'What makes salt soluble in water?', the most natural answer would be something of the style 'The fact that it has such-and-such structure'.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
     A reaction: Personally I would want to talk about its 'powers' (dispositional properties), rather than its 'structure' (categorical properties). This defends facts, but you could easily paraphrase 'fact' out of this reply (as McFetridge realised).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').