103 ideas
| 23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is an entirely different strength and mobility to maintaining oneself in an incomplete system, with free, open vistas, than in a dogmatic world. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[025]) | |
| A reaction: This is like Keats's 'negative capability' - the ability to live in a state of uncertainty. I'm a fan of attempts to create a philosophical system, but dogmatism would seem to be the death of such a project. How would you live with your system? Nice. |
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics doesn't let itself be held back by anything empirical, and indeed goes right to Ideas, where examples themselves fail. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 412.36) |
| 23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Bad writers have only shapeless floating splotches of concepts in their heads. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[083]) | |
| A reaction: Under 'conceptual analyis' not because he analyses concepts, but because he recognises their foundation importance in philosophy. I get more irritated by unchallenged concepts than by drifting concepts. Writer must know and challenge their key concepts. |
| 23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The same text allows innumerable interpretations: there is no 'correct' interpretation. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[120]) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to defend a 'correct' interpretation, but I think it is obvious to students of literature that some interpretations are very silly, such as reading things allegorically when there was no such intention. |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.82) |
| 23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What is searching for truth, truthfulness, honesty if not something moral? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[05]) | |
| A reaction: Feels right to me. It might be an effect of the virtue of respect. If you respect a person you tell them the truth (assuming they want the truth). Lying to someone is a sort of contempt. |
| 23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I, too, love truth, like all philosophers. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[02]) | |
| A reaction: Please pay attention to this remark! His perspectivalism is not a denial of truth. It is an epistemological phenomenon, not a metaphysical one. The perspectives are the nearest we can get to truth. Humanity therefore needs teamwork. |
| 23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The model of a complete fiction is logic. Here a thinking is made up where a thought is posited as the cause of another thought. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[249]) | |
| A reaction: He could almost be referring to Frege's Third Realm. Most hard core analytic philosophers seem to think that propositions have tight logical relationships which are nothing to do with the people who think them. |
| 23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Numbers are our major means of making the world manageable. We comprehend as far as we can count, i.e. as far as a constancy can be perceived. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[058]) | |
| A reaction: I don't agree with 'major', but it is a nice thought. The intermediate concept is a 'unit', which means identifying something as a 'thing', which is how we seem to grasp the world. So to what extent do we comprehend the infinite. Enter Cantor… |
| 23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of appearances selected and summarised by an interpreting being. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[115]) | |
| A reaction: Since innumerable events are nested within one another, such as the events at a carnival, this is obviously true. A primitive 'Kim event' (an object changes a property) might have objective existence. Carnivals happen, though. |
| 23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I do not grant to the metaphysicians that the 'I' is what thinks: on the contrary I take the I itself as a construction thinking, of the same rank as 'material',' thing', 'substance', 'purpose', 'number': therefore only as a regulative fiction. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[35]) | |
| A reaction: Ah. I have always defended the Self, the thing that is in charge when the mind is directed to something. I suddenly see that this is compatible with the Self not being the thinker! It is just the willer, and the controller of the searchlight. Self = will? |
| 23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Appearance as I understand it is the actual and single reality of things - that which first merits all existing predicates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[53]) | |
| A reaction: This is the view espoused by John Stuart Mill (a fact which would shock Nietzsche!). Elsewhere he laughs at the concept of the thing-in-itself as a fiction. |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| Full Idea: With the categorical imperative or law of morality we have a very serious difficulty, because it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 420.50) |
| 23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Experience is only possible with the help of memory; memory is only possible by virtue of an abbreviation of an intellectual event as a sign. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[249]) | |
| A reaction: My memory of a town is not formed as a sign, but as a bunch of miscellaneous fragments about it. I think mental files gives a better account of this than do 'signs'. |
| 23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There are schematic minds, those who hold a thought-complex to be truer if it can be sketched into previously drafted schemata or categorical tables. There are countless self-deceptions in this area: nearly all the great 'systems' belong here. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[09]) | |
| A reaction: Why 'nearly all'? Aristotle might be a candidate for such a person. Leibniz, perhaps. Nietzsche identified with Becoming and Heraclitus, as opposed to Being and Parmenides. |
| 23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: From the standpoint of each of our fundamental drives there is a different perspectival assessment of all events and experiences. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[058]) | |
| A reaction: Revealing. Perspectives are not just each individual person's viewpoint, but something more fine-grained than that. Our understanding and response are ambiguous, because we ourselves are intrinsically ambiguous. Super-relativism! |
| 23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The intellect and the senses are above all a simplifying apparatus. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[046]) | |
| A reaction: Very plausible, and not an idea I have met elsewhere. There's a PhD here for someone. It fits with my view as universals in language (which is most of language), which capture diverse things by ironing out their differences. |
| 23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We have a double brain: our capacity to will, to feel and to think of our willing, feeling, thinking ourselves is what we summarise with the word 'consciousness'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[087]) | |
| A reaction: Pretty much the modern HOT (higher order thought) theory of consciousness. Higher order thought distinguishes us from the other animals, but I think they too are probably conscious, so I don't agree. Why is level 2 conscious of level 1? |
| 23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In our conscious intellect there must be an excluding drive that scares things away, a selecting one, which only permits certain facts to present themselves. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
| A reaction: I like this because he is endorsing the idea that philosophy needs faculties, which may not match the views of psychologists and neuroscientists. Quite nice to think of faculties as drives. |
| 23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Something that lives wants above all to discharge its strength: 'preservation' is only one of the consequences of this. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 2[063]) | |
| A reaction: This seems to fit a dynamic man like Nietzsche, rather than someone who opts for a quiet and comfortable life. |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 446.97) |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 456.115) |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 448.101) |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of the "free will", of the will in and for itself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: This is the social determinism of Marx and Engels. Most commentators would say that Kant was taking the idea of "free will" from religion rather than politics, but presumably Marx would merely reply "same thing!" |
| 23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The absolute necessity of all events contains nothing of a compulsion. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[114]) | |
| A reaction: I like to look for necessity-makers behind necessities. So if the event is not necessary because of its cause, where does it come from? Is it that the whole sequence is a unified necessity? |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks emotions can't contribute to moral worth because emotions are too capricious, they are too passive, and they are fortuitously distributed by nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Morality and the emotions p.226 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] If, like Kant, you want morality to be concerned with rational principles, then you will want morality to be clear, stable and consistent - which emotions are not. I'm with Williams on this one. |
| 23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Concepts are more or less definite groups of sensations that arrive together. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[086]) | |
| A reaction: I like this because I favour accounts of concepts which root them in experience, and largely growing unthinking out of communcal experience. Nietzsche is very empirical here. Hume would probably agree. |
| 23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A concept is an invention that doesn't correspond entirely to anything; but to many things a little bit. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
| A reaction: This seems to cover some concepts quite well, but others not at all. What else does 'square' correspond to? |
| 23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The most useful concepts have survived: however falsely they may have originated. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[063]) | |
| A reaction: The germ of both pragmatism, and of meaning-as-use, here. The alternative views must be that the concepts are accurate or true, or that they are simply a matter of whim, maintained by authority. |
| 23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: A thought in the shape in which it comes is an ambiguous sign that needs interpretation, more precisely, needs an arbitrary narrowing-down and limitation, until it finally becomes unambiguous. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 38[01]) | |
| A reaction: This is exactly my view of propositions, as mental events. Introspect your thinking process. Track the progress from the first glimmer of a thought to its formulation in a finished sentence. Language, unlike propositions, can be ambiguous. |
| 23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Some of the aesthetic valuations are more fundamental than the moral ones e.g. the pleasure in what is ordered, surveyable, limited, in repetition. The logical, arithmetical and geometrical good feelings form the ground floor of aesthetic valuations. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[02]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche's originality is so striking because his novel suggestions are always plausible. Lots of modern philosophers (especially, I fear, in the continental tradition) throw out startling ideas which then fail on closer inspection. |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant united the two ideas of virtue (as being and as doing) into the idea of a law that is founded not upon faith but upon reason. Thus in one stroke he united the seemingly irreconcilable philosophical and religious ethics, preserving the best of both. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: An interesting analysis that sounds exactly right. Taylor's point is that Kant subjects himself to an authority, when the underpinnings of the authority are no longer there. There is a religious strand in the altruistic requirements of utilitarianism too. |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: As to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the categorical imperative seems to be silent. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: I think this is the fatal objection to Kant's view. He says, for example, that promise-breaking is inconsistent with a belief that promises are good, but who said promises are good? No ethical system can get started without values. |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant was a psychological hedonist about all actions except those done for the sake of the moral law, and this faulty theory of human nature prevented him from seeing that moral virtue might be compatible with the rejection of the categorical imperative. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Philippa Foot - Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives p.165 | |
| A reaction: Nice. Kant wasn't unusual in his view, which seems standard in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Aristotle understood that it is human nature, on the whole, to want to be a good citizen, since we are social beings. |
| 23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In nature's such as Caesar and Napoleon we intuit something of a 'disinterested' laboring on one's marble, regardless of any sacrifice of human beings. The future of the highest human beings lies on here: to bear responsibility and not collapse under it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[056]) | |
| A reaction: Hideous. Nietzsche at his absolute worst. You would think there was some wonderful higher good to which they were leading the human race, when they just strike me as people who liked fighting, and adored winning. |
| 23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: With Napoleon only the essential instincts of humanity came into consideration during his calculations, and he had a right not to take notice of the exceptional ones e.g. of compassion. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
| A reaction: Napoleon was notoriously indifferent to casualties, and I find it depressing that Nietzsche supports him. Napoleon brought misery to Europe for nearly twenties, mainly because he loved winning battles. Nothing über about that. |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: We are limited to pursuits which are acceptable from the standpoint of others; ..hence we can't value just anything, and there are things which we must value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' x | |
| A reaction: This at least moves towards greater objectivity, compared with Idea 9749, but it now seems deeply conservative. Our values become lowest common denominator. We need space for the Nietzschean moral hero, who creates new values. |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant grossly inflated the importance of the human dimension of value in which moral considerations are indeed overriding. He unjustifiably denied the perfectly reasonable contributions of the cultural and personal dimensions to human well-being. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Kekes - The Human Condition 05.5 | |
| A reaction: Excellent to see someone talking about the ultimate values that reside behind Kant's theory. Without such assumptions his theory is, frankly, ridiculous (as Mill explained). |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: According to Kant, we confer value on the objects of our rational choices. ..When we choose things because they are important to us we are taking ourselves to be important. Hence our humanity is a source of value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' ix | |
| A reaction: He's trying to filter to out our gormless choices with the word 'rational', but it is common sense that I may choose things despite thinking they have little value, like watching soap opera. A more objective account of value seems needed. See 9750! |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant's fundamental sermon is that a value is made a value (or, at least, a duty) by human choice and not by some intrinsic quality in itself, out there. Values are what humans freely choose to live, fight and die for. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: If this is right, then it would appear that the great Kant is the father of relativism, which wouldn't please him. However, his whole system rests on what is consistent and rational, and that seems to a value that is above our choices. |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We are pleased to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a nobler motive, but in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulsions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 407.26) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like Nietzsche than Kant. If some impulsions are totally hidden from us, then they are presumably irrelevant to any rational or moral thinking. Look at the deeds. |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.16 n) | |
| A reaction: Presumably simple love of someone or something could achieve this, without the addition of reverence. I'm suspicious of this idea, because some dreadful people have commanded reverence. |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 394.3) | |
| A reaction: This invites the obvious objection of the well-meaning fool, who causes misery despite meaning well. I firmly hold the view that what matters is what we do, not what we intend. |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| Full Idea: What is essentially good in an action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 416.43) | |
| A reaction: Dreadful idea. I always claim that consequences are relevant in Kant, in formulating and choosing maxims for action, but this idea seems to refute my view. This is a slogan for the Spanish Inquisition. |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The 'golden rule' is merely derivative from our principle, but it cannot be a universal law since it isn't the ground of duties to oneself or others (since it implies a breakable contract). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68 n) |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A morally good attitude of mind (or virtue) claims the intrinsic value of dignity, because it affords a rational being a share in the making of universal law, which therefore fits him to be a member in a possible kingdom of ends. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 435.79) |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks that if virtue becomes a stable disposition of the person, then it turns into a rigid mechanical habit, with respect to which the person is passive, and thus not fully morally accountable. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.1 |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: For Kant, generosity is a vice, because it is a form of condescension and patronage, and pity is detestable, because it entails a superiority on the part of the pitier, which Kant stoutly denied. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
| A reaction: An interesting view, but being too proud to receive help from friends strikes me as a greater vice. How can friendship and community be built, if we do not rush to help one another when needed? The virtue is generosity without condescension. |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| Full Idea: Kantian respect is unlike love. It's unlike sympathy. It's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling. ...Kantian respect is for humanity as such, for a rational capacity that resides, undifferentiated, in all of us. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 05 | |
| A reaction: Why is it 'undifferentiated'? If reason is the source of the respect, why don't greater powers of reason command greater respect? The nice thing is that the rejected versions involve bias, but Kant's version does not. |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that by 'maxim' Kant does not mean a specific intention for some discrete act, but the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions, ...which leads to a virtue reading of Kant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §7 | |
| A reaction: Kant admired virtue of character, and would want to fit it into the framework of his moral duties. Nevertheless a virtue would often seem to be beyond words, and principles seem to crumble in the face of complex cases. |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| Full Idea: We can reverse the terms of the comparison and ask not how rational is goodness, but why is it good to be rational? | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History | |
| A reaction: [Putnam doesn't mention Kant]. This seems to me to be the biggest question for Kant. See Idea 1403. The main point of tbe romantic movement, I take it, is that purely rational living does not bring happiness or fulfilment. |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Agreeable results could be brought about by other causes;…therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which is present only in a rational being, can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.15) |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.19), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Religion' | |
| A reaction: [p.19 in Beck tr] In Aristotle's account these are 'controlled' actions [enkrateia], which are a step below virtuous actions, which combine reason and pleasure. |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality essentially in terms of each other. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §20.2 | |
| A reaction: An interesting comment on the modern tendency to overvalue freedom at the expense of the other civic virtues. |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.1) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the thought of Epictetus, that the will is the source of goodness, because morality resides in choices (as opposed to character, or states of affairs). |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.81) |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: To tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.18) |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: For the divine or holy will there are no imperatives: 'I ought' is here out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Man is subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 432.73) |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| Full Idea: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is decided upon. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 399.13) |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: Kant is obviously a million miles away from Marxist pragmatism. And yet the members of the revolutionary class can only be identified and endorsed if they show a particular kind of will. |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| Full Idea: An implausible and uncomfortable conclusion to be drawn from Kant's conception of morality is that we must attribute high moral worth to deeply unattractive human lives. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Graham quotes a loathsome character from a Victorian novel, who coldly 'does her duty'. Indeed it might be that a robot could be programmed with the categorical imperative (though it would need a table of values first). Virtue theory is the answer. |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Anyone educated into the Kantian notion of duty will (so far) have been educated into easy conformism with authority. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: The Nazi Eichmann cited Kant at his trial for mass murder. I'm not sure the criticism is fair. There are surely times when the categorical imperative will go quite contrary to what the irrational authorities are implementing? |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: With sufficient ingenuity, almost every precept can be consistently universalized. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A concise statement of J.S.Mill's point (Idea 3762). The point is that Kant seems to allow burglary, as long as you don't complain when you are burgled. What sort of maxim would a suicidal mass murderer being willing to universalize? |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to capture the widespread intuition that one ought not to make an exception of oneself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:83 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I always take the plain English version to be 'what if everybody did that?' Suppose I were to forgive everyone, except myself? |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant's rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
| A reaction: This is one of the key objections to Kant (along with his need for preliminary values). One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. The charge adds up to Nietzsche's view, that Kant could never shake off his very conventional prejudices. |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the categorical imperative provides me with a test for rejecting proposed maxims; it does not tell me whence I am to derive the maxims which first provide the need for a test. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Nice objection. 'What if we all stood on one leg for an hour (in this crisis)?' Question for Kant: what sort of maxims should we consider, when faced with a dilemma. Mill will obviously suggest happiness as a target. Good of society? My own good? |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: If we enquire whether I can consistently universalize the maxim 'I may break my promises only when.....', the gap can be filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances, but to very few others. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Another good objection to Kant. There is just a huge problem with how you state the maxim under discussion. One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. 'Do everything possible to implement the will of God'. |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Kant's four illustrations of the Categorical Imperative are: the contradiction of suicide, the contradiction of false promises, the contradiction of neglecting your talents, and the contradiction of neglecting charity. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 422.53) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA429 p.96), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: This sets up the Kingdom of Ends. Note that this does not prohibit using people as a means. It just asks you to respect waiters and shop assistants. It seems to say you should not treat 'your own person' merely as a means. Prostitution? |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 403.19) |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any logical or physical impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism Ch.1 |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The categorical imperative smells of cruelty. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals II.§6 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is because it is so pure and impersonal. Seems harsh. Nowadays we don't think pure just has to be cruel, but Nietzsche may have assumed it had to be. |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.17) |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The universal imperative may also run as follows: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature'. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 421.52) |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA434 p.102), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: Each individual gives themselves a law in the categorical imperative. Presumably the kingdom of ends is the convergence of these laws, because the categorical imperative has to be rational. |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Kant does not dictate what the maxim (the principle) of my action should be, and this is the crux. The individual has to decide the basis for their actions, rather than have it imposed on them, which differentiates us from the world of nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: Apparenty this inspired the Romantic era (the Age of Freedom?) just as much as the French Revolution. It is the chief doctrine of extreme individualism - except that the maxim chosen should be one on which rational beings should agree. |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another always as an end and never as a means only. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Does this really mean that I can't just negligently buy a newspaper without making an effort to respect its seller? How do I ensure that I treat myself as an end, and don't slip into treating myself as a means? What would that be like? Prostitution? |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature exists as an end in itself; this is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 429.66) |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Kant, we may suppose, would say that if a man were 'cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others', he would still find in himself a source that would enable him to do what is benevolent. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This identifies a strong appeal of Kant's theory - that whether we are morally good should not be a matter of luck in our upbringing or natural temperament. How is the vicious person to be saved, if not by reason? |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian view of what is important is that people should give moral considerations the highest deliberative priority, which Hegel attacked because it gives moral thought no content. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This points towards empathy and compassion as motivators, rather than reason, because there is some content to the morality, which calls out to us. |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant thought that man is his own law - he binds himself under the law which he gives himself. This is how lawlessness or experimentation is established. This is no more rigorously earnest than Sancho Panza's self-administered blows to his own ass. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Søren Kierkegaard - The Journals of Kierkegaard JP-I, 188 | |
| A reaction: It really is tempting to go easy on yourself rather than on others. Kant had the right ideas, but human beings aren't as disciplined as the categorical imperative requires. [SY] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.2) |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Since reason has been imparted to us as a practical power, which thus influences the will, its true function must be to produce a will which is good. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 396.7) |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Inclinations, as a source of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| Full Idea: There are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them. ..I maintain that an action of this kind, however right and amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.66) | |
| A reaction: We understand what he means (that principle is everything), but this still seems a big hole in his account, one which drives us to Aristotle's sensible views about what a nice person is really like. |
| 23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In the hands of the strongest every kind of pessimism and nihilism becomes only one more hammer and tool with which one mounts a new pair of wings on oneself. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 2[101]) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how this works. Why is great strength needed? Strength implies forceful overcoming. The wings come from rejecting nihilism, but why does that need strength? Aren't there people with wings who never even thought of nihilism? |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means, not considering that they should be used only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68) |
| 23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It is approaching, irrefutably, hesitatingly, terrible as fate, the great task and fate: how should the earth as a whole be governed? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[08]) | |
| A reaction: Two issues have accelerated the question, though we have yet to properly face it. One is the incredible increase in military destructiveness, and other is the damage to the planet caused by the relentless pursuit of wealth. |
| 23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The foundation of all aristocracies …is to resemble the ancestors as much as possible, which serves as the controlling morality: mourning at the thought of change and variation. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[22]) | |
| A reaction: This makes sense of the permanent residence of the family, full of portraits and family trees. Aristocrats preserve records of their predecessors, in a way that most of us don't, going back before grandparents. |
| 23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: People who speak one language and read the same newspapers today call themselves 'nations', and also want much too eagerly to be of common ancestry and history. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[203]) | |
| A reaction: This sort of nationalism is still with us, as white supremacy, and as history as mythology. But we can't just shake off a sense of which gene pools we come from, and which lines of history are our personal inheritance. |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is central to the idea of Kant as the main father of liberalism, the idea that every individual deserves respect, and hence has rights. The idea would also be a crucial element in Europe turning against slavery. |
| 23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Property owners are to a man of one belief: 'you have to own something to be something'. But this is the oldest and healthiest of all instincts: I would add 'you have to want more than you have in order to become more'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[11]) | |
| A reaction: An odd idea from someone who spent his later years living in one room in a guest house. The context of this is a rejection of socialism. The love of and need for property and possessions must be taken into account in any politics. |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant is often held to have completed a task begun by Grotius, giving a basis for natural law which does not invoke the will of God, but rather commands God himself to obedience. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Roger Scruton - A Dictionary of Political Thought 'Kant' | |
| A reaction: This project, if successful, would clinch the naturalistic response to the Euthyphro Question (Ideas 336 and 337). It is a key issue for atheists, who generally wish to deny that their lack of religion leads inevitably to amorality. |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant believed in retributive punishment, because he thought that a man would prefer being sent to prison to going to hospital. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: That is, even criminals welcome the dignity of being treated as if they are actually responsible for their deeds, and are not just victims of inner forces. Criminals demand free will! Truth is best, though; many of them are not responsible at all. |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called 'things' (rather than 'persons'). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) | |
| A reaction: Ugh. Is there nothing in between 'persons' and 'things'? How about a deeply comatose human, or an embryo? It is a gross distortion to think of a chimpanzee as a 'thing'. |
| 23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The alleged 'laws of nature' are formulas for power relationships… | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[247]) | |
| A reaction: Love it. This is precisely the powers ontology of modern philosophy of science. His Will to Power is not often recognised as closely related to this view. |
| 23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: In chemistry is revealed that every substance pushes its force as far as it can, then a third something emerges. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[51]) | |
| A reaction: This is the ontology of powers as the basis of science, of which I am a fan. It is Nietzsche's Will to Power in action, which is often mistakenly taken to only refer to human affairs. |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the idea of moral perfection, which reason traces a priori. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 408.29) |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: On Kant's view it never follows that we ought to do what God commands, for we would have to know that we always ought to do what God commands, but that would need a standard of moral judgement independent of God's commands. God's commands are redundant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very powerful argument, even an undeniable one. How could you accept any authority if you didn't have some standards for accepting it, even if the standard was just to be awestruck by someone's charisma and will-power? |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant speaks of God not as something known or proved to exist by virtue of rational argument, but as a postulate of moral reflection (that is, of 'practical reason'). | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is a necessary postulate, which makes this a transcendental argument, surely? |