12 ideas
21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
Full Idea: Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its project is unbounded. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 2nd) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to identify the mind's creation of universals as the source of this power, rather than reason. Generalisations are infinitely extensible. Cantor's infinities are a nice example. Can't ideas be extended irrationally? |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The important thing about proper names is that it would be ridiculous to think that having linguistic competence can be equated in their case with knowledge of a necessary and sufficient condition. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II B) |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
Full Idea: The only place for essentialism to come from in Putnam's semantic account is out of the 'same kind' relation. But if the same kind relation can be cashed out in terms that do not involve sharing properties (apart from 'being water') there is a gap. | |
From: comment on Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.4 | |
A reaction: [This is the criticism of Salmon and Mellor] See Mackie's discussion for details. I would always have thought that relations result from essences, so could never be used to define them. |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Scientists are not trying to maximise some formal property of 'simplicity'; they are trying to maximise truth. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], III B) | |
A reaction: This seems to be aimed at the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws of nature, as the simplest axioms of experience. I'm with Putnam (as he was at this date). |
21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
Full Idea: Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], Intro) | |
A reaction: So free will either requires total substance dualism, or it is best described as transcendental fictionalism. This seems to imply the Leibnizian idea that metaphysics contains facts which having nothing to do with the physical world. |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
Full Idea: In previous papers I suggested that the reference is fixed by a test known to experts; it now seems to me that this is just a special case of my use being causally connected to an introducing event. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C) | |
A reaction: I think he was probably right the first time, and has now wandered off course. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
Full Idea: The highest task which nature has set mankind is to establish a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just constitution. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 5th) | |
A reaction: The 'force' is to restrict the harms that may result from individual freedom. This seems to equate justice with liberal freedom. Force can prevent direct harm to others, but what to do about indirect harm? Many lack freedom, but whose fault is it? |
21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
A reaction: This is a rather American view of liberalism. Kant has been praising the virtues of aggressive competition. |
21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
Full Idea: There is hope that the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
A reaction: Apart from Diogenes of Sinope, Kant seems to have been the first great champion of the cosmopolitan ideal. As I write (2018) the western world is putting up growing barriers against immigrants. I think my response may be to adopt Kantian cosmopolitanism. |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Putnam implies dispensing with the designation of natural kinds by singular terms in favour of the postulation of necessary but a posteriori connections between predicates. ...We might call this 'predicate essentialism', but not 'de re essentialism'. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 10.1 | |
A reaction: It is characteristic of modern discussion that the logical form of natural kind statements is held to be crucial, rather than an account of nature in any old ways that do the job. So do I prefer singular terms, or predicate-connections. Hm. |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds can be associated with 'strong' stereotypes (giving a strong picture of a typical member, like a tiger), or with 'weak' stereotypes (with no idea of a sufficient condition, such as molybdenum or elm). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C) |