Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Universal Arithmetick' and 'Three theses about dispositions'

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton]
     Full Idea: By a Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity to another Quantity of the same Kind, which we take for unity.
     From: Isaac Newton (Universal Arithmetick [1669]), quoted by John Mayberry - What Required for Foundation for Maths? p.407-2
     A reaction: This needs a metaphysics of 'kinds' (since lines can't have ratios with solids). Presumably Newton wants the real numbers to be more basic than the natural numbers. This is the transition from Greek to modern.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property.
     From: report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii
     A reaction: It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').