4 ideas
17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
Full Idea: By a Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the abstracted Ratio of any Quantity to another Quantity of the same Kind, which we take for unity. | |
From: Isaac Newton (Universal Arithmetick [1669]), quoted by John Mayberry - What Required for Foundation for Maths? p.407-2 | |
A reaction: This needs a metaphysics of 'kinds' (since lines can't have ratios with solids). Presumably Newton wants the real numbers to be more basic than the natural numbers. This is the transition from Greek to modern. |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Nothing can be predicated of something which does not exist. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.28) | |
A reaction: [He says he is 'agreeing with Plantinga' on this] This seems very puzzling, as you can obviously say that dragons do not exist, but they breathe fire. Why can't you attach predicates to hypothetical objects? |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence containing the individual, along with properties and relations. | |
From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.22) | |
A reaction: Since Russell took properties and relations to be features of reality, this made the whole proposition a feature of reality. This is utterly different from what I understand by the word 'proposition', which is a feature of thought, not of the world. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |