29 ideas
14179 | The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato] |
Full Idea: By far the greatest and fairest branch of wisdom is that which is concerned with the due ordering of states and families, whose name is moderation and justice. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 209a) | |
A reaction: ['Justice' is probably 'dikaiosune'] It is hard to disagree with this, and it relegates ivory tower philosophical contemplation to second place, unlike the late books of Aristotle's Ethics. |
1607 | Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: According to Diotima, the Forms are the objects of desire operative in philosophical discourse. | |
From: report of Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a4-) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.199 |
174 | True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato] |
Full Idea: There is a state of mind half-way between wisdom and ignorance - having true opinions without being able to give reasons for them. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202a) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2140, where Plato scorns this state of mind. What he describes could be split into two - purely lucky true beliefs, and 'externalist knowledge', with non-conscious justification. |
181 | Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato] |
Full Idea: We retain identity not by staying the same (the preserve of gods) but by replacing losses with new similar acquisitions. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 208b) | |
A reaction: Any modern student of personal identity should be intrigued by this remark! It appears to take a rather physical view of the matter, and to be aware of human biology as a process. Are my continuing desires token-identical, or just 'similar'? |
180 | We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato] |
Full Idea: During the period from boyhood to old age, man does not retain the same attributes, though he is called the same person. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 207d) | |
A reaction: This precisely identifies the basic problem of personal identity over time. If this is the problem, DNA looks more and more significant for the answer, though it would be an awful mistake to think a pattern of DNA was a person. |
4026 | Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato] |
Full Idea: Ugliness is out of harmony with everything that is godly; beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206d) | |
A reaction: This remark shows how the concept of 'harmony' is at the centre of Greek thought (and is a potential bridge of the is/ought gap). |
172 | Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato] |
Full Idea: There cannot be such a thing as love of ugliness. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201a) |
173 | Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato] |
Full Idea: What is good is the same as what is beautiful. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 201c) |
183 | Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato] |
Full Idea: The second stage of progress is to realise that beauty of soul is more valuable than beauty of body. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210b) |
184 | Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: One should step up from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, until at last one knows what absolute beauty is. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 211c) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is why Socrates refused sexual favours to Alcibiades. The idea is inspiring, and yet it is a rejection of humanity. |
171 | Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato] |
Full Idea: Music may be called a knowledge of the principles of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 187c) |
176 | Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of things, and Love is love of beauty, so it follows that Love must be a love of wisdom. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204b) | |
A reaction: Good, but wisdom isn't the only exceptionally beautiful thing. Music is beautiful partly because it is devoid of ideas. |
14177 | Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Phaedrus: Love is not only the oldest and most honourable of the gods, but also the most powerful to assist men in the acquisition of merit and happiness, both here and hereafter. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 180b) | |
A reaction: Maybe we should talk less of love as a feeling, and more as a motivation, not just in human relationships, but in activities like gardening and database compilation. |
179 | Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato] |
Full Idea: Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206a) | |
A reaction: Even the worst human beings often have lovers. 'Perpetual' is a nice observation. |
177 | If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato] |
Full Idea: 'What will be gained by a man who is good?' 'That is easy - he will be happy'. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 205a) | |
A reaction: Suppose you tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (a good deed), but failed. Happiness presumably results from success, rather than mere good intentions. |
14178 | Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato] |
Full Idea: By happy you mean in secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful? - Certainly. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 202c) | |
A reaction: We seem to have lost track of the idea that beauty might be an essential ingredient of happiness. |
170 | The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato] |
Full Idea: The only form of servitude which has no dishonour has for its object the acquisition of excellence. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 184c) |
182 | The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato] |
Full Idea: The man who would pursue the right way to his goal must begin, when he is young, by contemplating physical beauty. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 210a) |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes suggested that our ability to recognise a single occurrence as an instance of mental causation is a feature which distinguishes mental causation from physical or 'Humean' causation. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Hume says regularities are needed for mental causation too. Concentrate hard on causing a lightning flash - 'did I do that?' Gradually recovering from paralysis; you wouldn't just move your leg once, and know it was all right! |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: In spite of Mackie's announced aim of analysing singular causal statements, it is doubtful that the entities that he is concerned with can be consistently interpreted as spatio-temporally bounded individual events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §3 | |
A reaction: This is because Mackie mainly talks about 'conditions'. Nearly every theory I encounter in modern philosophy gets accused of either circular definitions, or inadequate individuation conditions for key components. A tough world for theory-makers. |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
Full Idea: Relations of necessity and sufficiency seem best suited for properties and for property-like entities such as generic states and events; their application to individual events and states is best explained as derivative from properties and generic events. | |
From: comment on J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Jaegwon Kim - Causes and Events: Mackie on causation §4 | |
A reaction: This seems to suggest that necessity must either derive from laws, or from powers. It is certainly hard to see how you could do Mackie's assessment of necessary and sufficient components, without comparing similar events. |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
Full Idea: The details of Mackie's analysis are complex, but the general idea is that the cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.3.3 | |
A reaction: Helpful. Why does something have to be 'the' cause? Immediacy is a vital part of it. A house could be a 'fire waiting to happen'. Oxygen is an INUS condition for a fire. |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
Full Idea: A necessary causal condition is closely related to a counterfactual conditional: if no-cause then no-effect, and a sufficient causal condition is closely related to a factual conditional (Goodman's phrase): since cause-here then effect. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §4) | |
A reaction: The 'factual conditional' just seems to be an assertion that causation occurred (dressed up with the logical-sounding 'since'). An important distinction for Lewis. Sufficiency doesn't seem to need possible-worlds talk. |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
Full Idea: My account shows how a singular causal statement can be interpreted, and how the corresponding sequence can be shown to be causal, even if the corresponding complete laws are not known. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9) | |
A reaction: Since the 'complete' laws are virtually never known, it would be a bit much to require that to assert causation. His theory is the 'INUS' account of causal conditions - see Idea 8333. |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
Full Idea: If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition. | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary. |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: For general causal statements Mackie favours a nomological account, but for singular causal statements he argued for an analysis in terms of subjunctive conditionals. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2 | |
A reaction: These seem to be consistent, by explaining each by placing it within a broader account of reality. Personally I think Ducasse gives the best account of how you get from the particular to the general (via similarity and utility). |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
Full Idea: We may say not merely that this virus causes yellow fever, but also that it is 'the' cause of yellow fever; but we could only say that sweet-eating causes dental decay, not that it is the cause of dental decay (except in an individual case). | |
From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §3) | |
A reaction: A bit confusing, but there seems to be something important here, concerning the relation between singular causation and law-governed causation. 'The' cause may not be sufficient (I'm immune to yellow fever). So 'the' cause is the only necessary one? |
175 | Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato] |
Full Idea: No god is a lover of wisdom or desires to be wise, for he is wise already. | |
From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204a) |