Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes' and 'Nominalism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets

8956	What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
	Full Idea: The relationship between an object and its singleton is puzzling. Our intuitive conception of a set is a collection of objects - what are we to make of a collection of a single object?
	From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 4.1)
	A reaction: The ontological problem seems to be the same as that of the empty set, and indeed the claim that a pair of entities is three things. For logicians the empty set is as real as a pet dog, but not for me.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete

8953	Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
	Full Idea: It is better not to include in the definition of abstract entities that they ontologically depend on their concrete correlates. Note: ..but they may depend on the totality of concreta; maybe 'the supervenience of the abstract' is part of ordinary thought.
	From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2)
	A reaction: [the quoted phrase is from Gideon Rosen] It certainly seems unlikely that the concept of the perfect hexagon depends on a perfect hexagon having existed. Human minds have intervened between the concrete and the abstract.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

15785	Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15786	Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind

8954	Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
	Full Idea: The vocabulary of geometry is sufficient to identify the circle, but could not be used to identify any circular paint patch. The reason must be that the circle lacks certain properties that can distinguish paint patches from one another.
	From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2)
	A reaction: I take this to be support for the traditional view, that abstractions are created by omitting some of the properties of physical objects. I take them to be fictional creations, reified by language, and not actual hidden entities that have been observed.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation

8955	Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
	Full Idea: In current discussions, abstract entities are usually distinguished as 1) in principle imperceptible, 2) incapable of causal interaction, 3) not located in space-time. The first is often explained by the second, which is in turn explained by the third.
	From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2)
	A reaction: Szabó concludes by offering 3 as the sole criterion of abstraction. As Lewis points out, the Way of Negation for defining abstracta doesn't tell us very much. Courage may be non-spatiotemporal, but what about Alexander the Great's courage?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').