Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Diffrance' and 'works'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Wittgenstein is the most renowned modern proponent of substance, and argued that sense must be determinate ...and that any conceptual scheme which genuinely represents a world cannot contain infinite backward chains of meaning.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (works [1935]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.3
     A reaction: This is a key idea for explaining the somewhat surprising revival of the notion of substance in modern times, when it appeared to have been buried by atomism in the seventeenth century. The new argument is a semantic one.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning]
     Full Idea: What Derrida calls 'différance' can be understood as the movement through which every sign is 'constituted historically as a weave of differences'....This replacement for 'speech' in the 'origin' of the system is to avoid the circularity in structuralism.
     From: report of Jacques Derrida (Différance [1982]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5
     A reaction: [compressed] Struggling to grasp this. Some English words entirely change their meaning over time (e.g. buxom). Does the lost meaning remain part of the new meaning? If so, how? He also calls différance 'sameness which is not identical'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').