Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'What is 'naturalized epistemology'?' and 'Lewis's Programme'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
     Full Idea: In reaction to two classic difficulties in Goodman's treatment of counterfactuals - the contenability problem and the explication of law - a radically different approach was instigated by Stalnaker (1968) and has been developed by Lewis.
     From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p208)
     A reaction: [I record this for study purposes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
     Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304)
     A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
     Full Idea: In my view, counterfactual conditionals are analysed in terms of causation.
     From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p.208)
     A reaction: This immediately sounds more plausible to me. Counterfactual claims are rather human, whereas causation (if we accept it) seems a feature of nature. The key question is whether some sort of 'dependency' is a feature of counterfactuals.