Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication' and 'On Sufficient Reason'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought

19404	Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The principle of contradiction is the principle of necessity, and the principle that a sufficient reason must be given is the principle of contingency.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: [this paragraph is actually undated] Contradictions occur in concrete actuality, as well as in theories and formal systems. If so, then there are necessities in nature. Are they discoverable a posteriori? Leibniz says not.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

14235	Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
	Full Idea: If the rule is asserted 'Given any well-determined objects, they can be collected into a set by an application of the 'set of' operation', then on the usual account of 'they' this is a tautology. Collection comes automatically with this form of reference.
	From: James Cargile (Paradoxes: Form and Predication [1979], p.115), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? Intro
	A reaction: Is this a problem? Given they are well-determined (presumably implying countable) there just is a set of them. That's what set theory is, I thought. Of course, the iterative view talks of 'constructing' the sets, but the construction looks unstoppable.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

19403	Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world?