Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'works' and 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
     Full Idea: What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
     Full Idea: The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
     Full Idea: The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.207)
     A reaction: The best slogan I can find for summarising Foot's metaethics. The facts she refers to the basic human needs. She is right, and this almost bridges the fact-value divide (as long as you give a damn about human needs).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / b. Heat
Heat is a state of vibration, not a substance [Joule]
     Full Idea: We consider heat not as a substance but as a state of vibration.
     From: James Joule (works [1870]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Nature's'
     A reaction: The puzzle is that giving accurate accounts of vibrations, heat and movement require a quantitative substance, energy. But all we have here is movement, and the denial of a substance. Energy is 'nature's currency system'.
Joule showed that energy converts to heat, and heat to energy [Joule, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: James Joule established the equivalence of heat and mechanical energy, in the sense of showing that a specific amount of heat will always be produced by the expenditure of a given amount of energy, and vice versa.
     From: report of James Joule (works [1870]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 4.2
     A reaction: This was a major step towards the law of conservation of energy.