Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'There is immediate Justification' and 'Relations'

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14 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

21339	We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil]
	Full Idea: A satisfying account of relations must be ontologically serious. This means refusing to rest content with abstract specifications of relations as sets of ordered n-tuples.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], Intro)
	A reaction: A set of ordered entities would give the extension of a relation, which wouldn't, among other things, explain co-extensive relations (if all the people to my left were also taller than me). Heil's is a general cry from the heart about formal philosophy.

21349	Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil]
	Full Idea: If Simmias is taller than Socrates, they are indirectly related; they are related via their possession of properties that are themselves directly - and internally - related. Hence relational truths are made true by non-relational features of the world.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Founding')
	A reaction: This seems to be a strategy for reducing external relations to internal relations, which are intrinsic to objects, which thus reduces the ontology. Heil is not endorsing it, but cites Kit Fine 2000. The germ of this idea is in Plato.

21340	Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil]
	Full Idea: A striking idea is that relations are ontologically primary: monadic, non-relational features of the world are constituted by relations. A view of this kind is defended by Peirce, and contemporary 'structural realists' like Ladyman.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Relational')
	A reaction: I can't make sense of this proposal, which seems to offer relations with no relata. What is a relation? What is it made of? How do you individuate two instances of a relations, without reference to the relata?

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

21348	In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]
	Full Idea: We might say that the truthmakers for 'six is greater than five' are six and five themselves. On this view, truthmakers for one class of relational truths are non-relational features of the world.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Founding')
	A reaction: That seems to be a good way of expressing the existence of an internal relation.

21351	Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil]
	Full Idea: Truthmaking is a paradigmatic internal relation: if you have a truthbearer, a representation, and you have the world as the truthbearer represents it as being, you have truthmaking, you have the truthbearer's being true.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Causal')
	A reaction: It is nice to have an example of an internal relation other than numbers, and closer to the concrete world. Is the relation between the world and facts about the world the same thing, or another example?

21344	If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil]
	Full Idea: A simple way to think about internal relations is: if R internally relates a and b, then, if you have a and b, you thereby have R. If you have six and you have five, you thereby have six's being greater than five.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'External')
	A reaction: This seems to work a lot better for abstracta than for physical objects, where I am struggling to think of a parallel example. Parenthood? Temporal relations between things? Acorn and oak?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

21350	If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
	Full Idea: On the conception that properties are powers, it is no longer obvious that causal relations are external relations. Given the powers - all the powers in play - you have the manifestations.
	From: John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Causal')
	A reaction: This also delivers on a plate the necessity felt to be in causal relations, because the relation is inevitable once you are given the relata. But can you have an accidental (rather than essential) internal relation? Not in the case of numbers.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8845	An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
	Full Idea: To say that experiences have propositional content is not to say that experiences are beliefs.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: This is important for opponents of foundationalism, because they will not allow a raw experience to act as a justification on its own. Even if concepts, or even propositions, are offered by experience, the crucial evaluation must preceded knowledge.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8842	The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
	Full Idea: The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but from considering examples, such as I have a headache, I am raising my arm, I am imagining my grandmother, or seeing how dominoes could fill a chessboard.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §3)
	A reaction: Most of his examples depend on the fact that they cannot be challenged by anyone else, because they are within his own mind. The dominoes require complex thought. The first two could be erroneous if he was dreaming.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

8843	Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
	Full Idea: Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs; impure coherentists are willing to give some non-beliefs, such as perceptual experiences, a justifying role.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: I think I would vote for the pure version. The distinction that is needed, I think, is between justification and evidence. You have to surmise causal links and explanations before you can see an experience as evidence, and then justification.

8844	Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for coherentism is the claim that a justifier requires asserted propositional content, and that only beliefs represent propositions assertively.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: I think this claim (which Pryor attacks) is correct. A key point is that almost any experience can be delusional, and in need of critical evaluation. We would even only accept an experience as being necessarily veridical after critical evaluation.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

8846	Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
	Full Idea: If you have reasons for your belief, they should be considerations you could in principle cite, or give, to someone who doubted or challenged the belief. You can't give some else a non-propositional state like a headache.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §6)
	A reaction: On the whole I agree, but if someone asked you to justify your claim that there is a beautiful sunset over the harbour, you could just say 'Look!'. Headaches are too private. The person must still see that the sunset is red, and not the window.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs

8847	Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
	Full Idea: Ordinarily we make no intentional choices about what to believe, but one can choose to believe something, and then seek ways to get oneself to believe it.
	From: James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §7)
	A reaction: Deliberately reading the articles of a philosopher that you seem to agree with would be an example. Presumably the belief that this is a good belief and should be given support is not itself voluntarily chosen. Ultimately we are helpless. See Idea 1854.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').