11 ideas
12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise; philosophy is in false consciousness when it sees itself otherwise. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to be permeated with values, and another to be value-driven. Truth, reason and logic are (I take it) granted a high value in philosophy, just as the offside rule is in football. I am trying to place reality in charge, not humanity. |
12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: How likely is it that a truly successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Van Fraassen announces "I reject metaphysic" (p.3), so we know where he stands. Anything becomes less certain as it moves to a higher level of generality. Should we abandon generalisation? There is much illumination in metaphysics. |
12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: Analytical philosophy can rightly pride itself on having produced the greatest critical arsenal the world has ever known. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, in the context of a scathing attack on the desire to use analytical methods to do speculative metaphysics. I say that if these are the best tools, then we should push forward with them to see how far we can get. |
12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The specter that faces us is that we may end up having explained all that is dreamt of in our philosophies by intricately crafted postulates that are false. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is more persuasive that Idea 12769. People who cannot bear to live with a total absence of explanation (with Keats's 'negative capability') are most in danger from this threat. |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: A trope is an instance or bit (not an exemplification) of a property or a relation. Bill Clinton's eloquence is not his participating in the universal eloquence, or the peculiar quality of his eloquence, but his bit, and his alone, of eloquence. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], Intro) | |
A reaction: If we have identified something as a 'bit' of something, we can ask whether that bit is atomic, or divisible into something else, and we can ask what are the qualities and properties and powers of this bit, we seems to defeat the object. |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: A major attraction of tropism has been its promise of parsimony; some adherents (such as Campbell) go so far as to proclaim a one-category ontology. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §2) | |
A reaction: This seems to go against the folk idiom which suggests that it is things which have properties, rather than properties ruling to roost. Maybe if one identified tropes with processes, the theory could be brought more into line with modern physics? |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: 'Qualitons' or 'relatons' (quality and relation tropes) are held to belong to the same individual if they are all 'compresent' with one another. | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §4) | |
A reaction: There is a perennial problem with bundles - how to distinguish accidental compresence (like people in a lift) from united compresence (like people who make a family). |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
Full Idea: Meinongian tropism has the advantage that possible worlds might be thought of as sets of 'qualitons' and 'relatons' (quality and relational tropes). | |
From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §3) | |
A reaction: You are still left with 'possible' to explain, and I'm not sure that anything is explain here. If the actual world is sets of tropes, then possible worlds would also have to be, I suppose. |
12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The very phrase 'inference to the best explanation' should wave a red flag for us. What is good, better, best? What values are slipped in here, under a common name, and where do they come from? | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: A point worth making, but overstated. If we are going to refuse to make judgements for fear that some wicked 'value' might creep in, our lives will be reduced to absurdity. |
12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
Full Idea: The choice among theories in science may be a choice to accept in some sense falling far short of endorsement as true. | |
From: Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: When put like this, it is hard to deny the force of Van Fraassen's reservations about science. Lots of people, including me, use scientific theories as working assumptions for life, with nothing like full confidence in their truth. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |