Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life' and 'Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge'

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3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold]
     Full Idea: In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object, and relates it to both.
     From: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge [1791], p.78), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
     A reaction: This is a reminder that twentieth century analytic discussions of perception were largely recapitulating late Enlightenment German philosophy. This is a very good definition of sense-data. I can think about my representations. Reinhold was a realist.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
     From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
     A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').