Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Ordinatio' and 'Speaking of Objects'

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16 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
     Full Idea: We are prone to talk about physical and abstract objects. It is hard to know how else to talk, because we are bound to adapt any alien pattern to our own in the very process of understanding or translating the alien sentences.
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], pt.I,p.1)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
     Full Idea: Quine's well-known slogan "no entity without identity" means that no object should be admitted into our ontology unless its identity conditions, the conditions that say which object it is, have been settled.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960]) by Joseph Melia - Modality Ch.4
     A reaction: This invites science fiction scenarios, where we admit the existence of something before we have a clue what it is (whether it is physical, hallucination, divine..). Quine's slogan seems attractive but optimistic. How 'settled'?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: Accidents are principles of acting and principles of cognizing substance, and are the per se objects of the senses. But it is ridiculous to say that something is a principle of acting (either real or intentional) and yet does not have any formal being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.12.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.5
     A reaction: Pasnau cites this as the key scholastic argument for accidental properties having some independent and real existence (as required for Transubstantiation). Rival views say accidents are just 'modes' of a thing's existence. Aquinas compromised.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
     Full Idea: The lack of a proper identity concept for attributes (properties) is a lack that philosophers feel impelled to supply; for, what sense is there in saying there are attributes when there is no sense in saying when there is one attribute and when two?
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], IV)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being a really crucial question. There is a mistaken tendency to take any possible linguistic predicate as implying a natural property. I sympathise with the sceptics here (see Ideas 4029, 3906, 3322). How to individuate properties?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that if everything is singular, with no objective common feature, science would be impossible, as it proceeds from general concepts. General is the opposite of singular, so it would be inadequate to understand a singular reality.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: [compressed] It is a fact that if you generalise about 'tigers', you are glossing over the individuality of each singular tiger. That is OK for 'electron', if they really are identical, but our general predicates may be imposing identity on electrons.
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
     Full Idea: There is no denying the access of power that accrues to our conceptual scheme through the positing of abstract objects.
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], §5)
     A reaction: This seems right, both in its use of the word 'posit', and in its general pragmatic claim. So why? If they enable us to grapple with the world better, it must be because of their power of generalisation. They are nets thrown over chunks of reality.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it [that establishes distinctness of things]? It is, to be sure, that which is universally the reason for distinguishing one thing from another: namely, a contradiction…..If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2
     A reaction: This is a remarkably intellectualist view of such things. John Wycliff, apparently, enquired about how animals were going to manage all this sort of thing. It should appeal to the modern logical approach to metaphysics.
8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
     Full Idea: To adapt Quine's famous slogan ('no entity without identity'), I prefer to say 'no object without identity'.
     From: comment on Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], p.52) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 7.1
     A reaction: Quine was trying to make us all more scientific, but Lowe is closer to common sense. The sky is an entity, most of us would say, but with very shaky identity-conditions. A wave of the sea is a good example.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: For Scotus, the haecceity of an individual was a positive non-quidditative entity which, together with a common nature from which it was formally distinct, played the role of the ultimate differentia, thus individuating the substance.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3
     A reaction: Most thinkers seem to agree (with me) that this is a non-starter, an implausible postulate designed to fill a gap in a metaphysic that hasn't been properly worked out. Leibniz is the hero who faces the problem and works around it.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: It seems absurd …that there should be no difference between a whole that is one thing per se, and a whole that is one thing by aggregation, like a cloud or a heap.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], III.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.5
     A reaction: Leibniz invented monads because he was driven crazy by the quest for 'true unity' in things. Objective unity may be bogus, but I suspect that imposing plausible unity on things is the only way we can grasp the world.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48)
     A reaction: This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.3
     A reaction: This is the contrapositive of the indiscernibility of identicals, expressed in terms of what is true about a thing, rather than what properties pertain to it.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
     Full Idea: We could know the necessary and sufficient stimulatory conditions of every possible act of utterance, in a foreign language, and still not know how to determine what objects the speakers of that language believe in.
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], pt.III,p.11)
     A reaction: I just don't believe this, because the same scepticism then creeps into discussions of native speakers of a single language, and all communcation is blighted - which is nonsense.
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
     Full Idea: Translation of our remote past or future discourse into the terms we now know could be about as tenuous and arbitrary a projection as translation of a heathen language was seen to be.
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], pt.V,p.25)
     A reaction: Is he seriously saying that we can't understand Shakespeare, because holism implies that we would have to be Elizabethans? So scholarship is in vain? Is yesterday the 'past'?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').