Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'In Metaphysics' and 'Expositio super viii libros'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Later standard theories said that a real distinction obtains between two things that can each exist without the other. For Scotus a real distinction requires only that one of the pair be able to exist without the other.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], V.5-6 n91) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5
     A reaction: His example is the similarity relation, which is independent of the whiteness on which it is based (since the other thing can become non-white).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: No substance is understood in its own right, except in the most universal of concepts, namely of 'being'.
     From: John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], III n. 116), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.3
     A reaction: This is a fairly standard scholastic pessimism about knowing anything about substance. The modern view suggests that actually scientists know 'substance' pretty well.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is a certain quality which exists in the soul as its subject ('existens subiective in anima').
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: One might say here that knowledge is a property, and so it might not be susceptible to further analysis. It invites the question of how you could know by introspection that you have got it, which would be an extreme internalist view.
Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Sometimes 'knowledge' means evident cognition of the conclusion alone, sometimes of the demonstration as a whole.
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: 'Demonstration' will be something like Greek 'logos' - full understanding, ability to explain and give reasons. William is certainly right about normal usage. I know the answer in a quiz, without any requirement for justifications.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true.
     From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue)
     A reaction: This view has problems. William is not facing up to the sceptical questions which can shake any degree of certainty, and also that someone who lacked self-confidence might know many things while always feeling uncertain about them. 'Cognition' must go!
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').