10184
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Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess]
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Full Idea:
On the structuralist interpretation, theorems of analysis concerning the real numbers R are about all complete ordered fields. So R, which appears to be the name of a specific structure, is taken to be a variable ranging over structures.
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From:
John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1)
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A reaction:
Since I am beginning to think that nearly all linguistic expressions should be understood as variables, I find this very appealing, even if Burgess hates it. Terms slide and drift, and are vague, between variable and determinate reference.
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10187
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Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess]
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Full Idea:
Abstract algebra, such as group theory, is not concerned with the features common to all models of the axioms, but rather with the relationships among different models of those axioms (especially homomorphic relation functions).
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From:
John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1)
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A reaction:
It doesn't seem to follow that structuralism can't be about the relations (or patterns) found when abstracting away and overviewing all the models. One can study family relations, or one can study kinship in general.
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18665
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Moral problems are responsibility conflicts, needing contextual and narrative attention to relationships [Gilligan]
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Full Idea:
The moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights, and its resolution needs contextual and narrative thinking. This morality as care centers around the understanding of responsibility and relationships.
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From:
Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice [1982], p.19), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)
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A reaction:
[Kymlicka cites her as a key voice in feminist moral philosophy] I like all of this, especially the very original thought (to me, anyway) that moral thinking should be 'narrative' in character.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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