Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Minds, Brains and Science' and 'Prologue to Ordinatio'

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6 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
9100 Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Our intellect does not assent to anything unless we believe it to be true.
     From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being a much more accurate and commonsense view of belief than that of Hume, who simply views it phenomenologically. ...But then the remark appears to be circular. Belief requires a belief that it is true. Hm.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9101 Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Abstractive cognition (in one sense) relates to something abstracted from many singulars; and in this sense abstractive cognition is nothing else but cognition of a universal which can be abstracted from many things.
     From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being correct common sense, even though it has become deeply unfashionable since Frege. We may not be able to see quite how the mind manages to see universals in a bunch of objects, but there is no better story.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
2427 Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
     Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
     From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
     A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.
7389 A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
     Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
     From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
     A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.
7390 If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
     Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
     From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
     A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').