Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Virtue Epistemology' and 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

6410	The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues

19730	Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Virtue theorists may focus on the particular habits or virtues of successful cognizers, such as love of knowledge, firmness, courage and caution, humility, autonomy, generosity, and practical wisdom.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], III)
	A reaction: [He cites Roberts and Wood 2007] It is interesting that most of these virtues do not merely concern cognition. How about diligence, self-criticism, flexibility...?

19731	If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
	A reaction: It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.

19732	The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: The Swamping Problem is that the value of truth swamps the value of additional features of true beliefs which are only instrumentally related to them. True belief is no more valuable if one adds a feature valuable for getting one to the truth.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
	A reaction: His targets here are reliabilism and epistemic virtues. Kvanvig's implication is that the key to understanding the nature of knowledge is to pinpoint why we value it so much.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').