Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity' and 'A World of Dispositions'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
     A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5)
     A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
     A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
     A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2)
     A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
     A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer]
     Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations.
     From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3)
     A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything.