Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity' and 'On Fate ('De fato')'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

21677	How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
	Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?
	From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)
	A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17304	As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.

17306	If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
	A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations

17308	Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.

19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric

21667	Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
	Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.
	From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03)
	A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

21678	If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
	Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.
	From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40)
	A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature

17305	I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
	A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

17307	Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
	From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
	A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.