10 ideas
| 2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32) |
| 2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147) |
| 2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"? | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95) |
| 20752 | For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett] |
| Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be. | |
| From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem' | |
| A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it. |
| 2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19) |
| 2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false? | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22) |
| 20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40) | |
| A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing. |
| 20756 | Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett] |
| Full Idea: Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man. | |
| From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.217), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Situated' | |
| A reaction: Makes explicit the existentialist denial of human nature. The foundation of ethics can only be total freedom, to choose both yourself and your actions. What is inescapable is the social and culture contexts. What is the role of the 'history'? |
| 2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140) |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |