Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Toward a Philosophy of History' and 'On Platonism in Mathematics'

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6 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
     Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
     A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
     Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
     From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
     A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
     Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be.
     From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem'
     A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
     Full Idea: Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man.
     From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.217), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Situated'
     A reaction: Makes explicit the existentialist denial of human nature. The foundation of ethics can only be total freedom, to choose both yourself and your actions. What is inescapable is the social and culture contexts. What is the role of the 'history'?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').