14 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Habermas is concerned to avoid the traumas of modern German history by making democracy an integral part of philosophy. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
A reaction: Hence Habermas's emphasis on communication as central to language, which is central to philosophy. Modern philosophy departments are amazingly hierarchical. |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: For Habermas, the task of what he calls 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to be a stand-in and interpreter for the specialized sciences. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.5:65 |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Habermas claims to have embarked upon a new way of doing social philosophy, one that begins from an analysis of language use and that locates the rational basis of the coordination of action in speech. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:28 |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6 | |
A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused. |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Habermas claims that what is regarded as a priori changes with history. This is because the linguistic structures on which judgements depend are themselves part of history, not prior to it. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy Conc 'Habermas' | |
A reaction: This is an interesting style of argument generally only found in continental philosophers, because they see the problem as historical rather than timeless. Compare Idea 20595, which sees analyticity historically. |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
Full Idea: We understand the meaning of a speech act when we know what would make it acceptable. | |
From: Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981], I:297), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:37 | |
A reaction: Finlayson glosses this as requiring the reasons which would justify the speech act. |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: On Habermas's view, meanings are not determined by the speaker's relation to the external world, but by his relation to his interlocutors; meaning is essentially intersubjective. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:38 | |
A reaction: This view is not the same as Grice's, but it is clearly much closer to Grice than to (say) the Frege/Davidson emphasis on truth-conditions. I'm not sure if I would know how to begin arbitrating between the two views! |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
Full Idea: By 1790 the idea that a central task for the aesthetician was to explain or at least adequately to describe the phenomenon of the individual artistic genius had definitely taken hold. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence when Kant and Hegel write about art, though are only really thinking of the greatest art (which might be in touch with the sublime or Spirit etc.). Nowadays I think we expect accounts of art to cover modest amateur efforts as well. |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
Full Idea: Seeing art as expression has two components: 1) if something is a work of art, then it is expressive, 2) if something is expressive, then it is a work of art. So expression can be necessary or sufficient for art. (or both, for Croce and Collingwood). | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: I take the idea that art 'expresses' the feelings of an artist to be false. Artists are more like actors. Nearly all art has some emotional impact, which is of major importance, but I don't think 'expression' is a very good word for that. |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
Full Idea: The horror or terror of Edvard Much's 'The Scream' could in principle be expressed by different paintings, or even by works of music. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: A very good simple point against the idea that the point of art is expression. It leaves out the very specific nature of each work of art! |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
Full Idea: One cannot really know, or be conscious of, what it is that one is going to express, and then set about expressing it; indeed if one is genuinely conscious of it then one has already expressed it. | |
From: Gary Kemp (Croce and Collingwood [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: That pretty conclusively demolishes the idea that art is expression. I picture Schubert composing at the piano: he doesn't feel an emotion, and then hunt for its expression on the keyboard; he seeks out expressive phrases by playing. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: The ideal of equality, universality, and inclusiveness are inscribed in the communicative practices of the lifeworld, and agents, merely by virtue of communicating, conform to them. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.4:60 | |
A reaction: This summary of Habermas's social views strikes me as thoroughly Kantian. It is something like the ideals of the Kingdom of Ends, necessarily implemented in a liberal society. Habermas emphasises the social, where Kant starts from the liberal. |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Habermas thinks political deliberation is required precisely because in its absence people will tend to accept existing practices as given, and thereby perpetuate false needs. | |
From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'need' | |
A reaction: If the dream is healthy and intelligent progress, it is not clear where that should come from. The problem with state involvement in the authority and power of the state. Locals are often prejudiced, so the intermediate level may be best. |