Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Between Facts and Norms' and 'Presidential Address of Am. Math. Soc'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
We have no adequate logic at the moment, so mathematicians must create one [Veblen]
     Full Idea: Formal logic has to be taken over by mathematicians. The fact is that there does not exist an adequate logic at the present time, and unless the mathematicians create one, no one else is likely to do so.
     From: Oswald Veblen (Presidential Address of Am. Math. Soc [1924], 141), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: This remark was made well after Frege, but before the advent of Gödel and Tarski. That implies that he was really thinking of meta-logic.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas]
     Full Idea: Only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.
     From: Jürgen Habermas (Between Facts and Norms [1996], p.107), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:79
     A reaction: This remark stands somewhere between Kant and Rawls. The Holocaust stands behind Habermas's philosophy. The thought, I suppose, is that it would never have happened if everybody had been fully involved in the original discourse about it.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').