Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division' and 'Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags)'

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Objects do not by themselves naturally fall into countable units.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2)
     A reaction: Hm. This seems to be modern Fregean orthodoxy. Why did the institution of counting ever get started if the things in the world didn't demand counting? Even birds are aware of the number of eggs in their nest (because they miss a stolen one).
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The fact that there is overlap does not seem to inhibit our ability to count squares.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2)
     A reaction: She has a diagram of three squares overlapping slightly at their corners. Contrary to Frege, these seems to depend on a subliminal concept of the square that doesn't depend on language.
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Why do speakers of English count carrots but not asparagus? There is no 'deep' reason.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997])
     A reaction: Koslick is offering this to defend the Fregean conceptual view of counting, but what seems to matter is what is countable, and not whether we happen to count it. You don't need to know what carrots are to count them. Cooks count asparagus.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The reason we have a hard time counting the branches and the waves is because our concepts 'branches on the tree' and 'waves on the ocean' do not determine sufficiently precise boundaries: the concepts do not draw a clear invisible line around each thing.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2)
     A reaction: This is the 'isolation' referred to in Frege.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: Talk of snow concerns what stays the same when some snow changes, as it might be, from a heap of snow to a drift, to an expanse.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division [1997], 2.2)
     A reaction: The whiteness also stays the same, but isn't stuff.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
     Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people.
     From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b
     A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').