Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Case for Contextualism' and 'Appearance and Reality'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

5182	Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
	Full Idea: Such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as 'the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress' (F.H.Bradley) is not even in principle verifiable.
	From: comment on F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.1
	A reaction: One may jeer at the Verification Principle for either failing to be precise, or for failing to pass its own test, but Ayer still has a point here. When we drift off into sustained abstractions, we must keeping asking if we are still saying anything real.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

6864	Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
	Full Idea: Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct; but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.
	From: F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.165
	A reaction: A famous and very nice remark. The idea of believing things on instinct sounds more like David Hume than an idealist. Personally I am not so pessimistic about the enterprise. I think metaphysics is capable of changing what we believe.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

10999	Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
	Full Idea: Unless a name has associated with it a means of reidentifying its referent, we cannot use it.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.4
	A reaction: Brilliant! This point is totally undeniable. It is not enough that someone be 'baptised'. We need to hang onto both the name and what it refers to, and how are we going to do that?

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

6422	Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
	Full Idea: The doctrine of internal relations held that every relation between two terms expresses, primarily, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the two compose.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by Bertrand Russell - My Philosophical Development Ch.5
	A reaction: Russell's first big campaign was to reject this view, and his ontology from then on included relations among the catalogue of universals. The coherence theory of truth also gets thrown out at the same time. Russell seems right.

7966	Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
	Full Idea: If a relation between qualities is to be something, then clearly we will now require a new connecting relation. The links are united by a link, and this link has two ends, which require a fresh link to connect them to the old.
	From: F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893], p.28), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.6
	A reaction: That is: external relations generates an infinite regress, so relations must be internal. Russell launched his own philosophy with an attack on Bradley's idea. Personally I take how two things 'relate' to one another as one of the deepest of mysteries.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism

6404	British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: The idealism of Green and Bradley, both of whom were much influenced by the German Idealists, espoused the thesis that the universe ultimately consists of a single Mind which, so to speak, experiences itself.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This looks now like the last (extreme) throw by the religious view of the world, which collapsed in the face of the empirical realism of Russell and Moore. It is all Kant's fault, for cutting us off from his 'noumenon'.

22299	Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
	Full Idea: Objective idealists such as Bradley (rather than Berkeley's subjective view) accepted the substantial existence of reality (which they called the 'Absolute') but held that thought cannot fully describe it.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 23 'Abs'
	A reaction: That thought can't 'fully' describe it seems obvious, so I suspect Bradley's view are stronger than that. This sounds like modern strong and weak anti-realists; strong ones deny reality, but weak ones just deny we know where the joints are.

21343	Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
	Full Idea: In Bradley's view, qualities and relations belong to the realm of appearance. We are left with a single, undifferentiated substance: the Absolute.
	From: report of F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
	A reaction: I've not read Bradley, but I can't distinguish this proposal from Parmenides's belief in The One. Or maybe Spinoza's monist view of God and Nature (but that is 'differentiated'). It doesn't sound like Hegel.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

19513	A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
	Full Idea: If you are a coherentist and a contextualist, you'll probably want to hold that how strongly beliefs must cohere with one another in order to count as knowledge (if they are true), or to count as justified, is a contextually variable matter.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.09)
	A reaction: How exciting! He's talking about ME! Context might not only dictate the strength of the coherence, but also the range of beliefs involved. In fact all of Thagard's criteria of coherence may be subject to contextual variation.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

19514	Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
	Full Idea: The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)
	A reaction: That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.

19515	We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
	Full Idea: We might make the basic contextualist schema more precise ...by saying the change in content will consist in a change in the range of relevant alternatives. Higher standards would discriminate from a broader range of alternatives.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.14)
	A reaction: This would handle the 'fake barn' and 'disguised zebra' examples, by saying lower standards do not expect such discriminations. The zebra case has a lower standard than the barn case (because fake barns are the norm here).

19510	In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
	Full Idea: I'm inclined to accept that in certain contexts the standards for knowledge are so low that little more than true belief is required.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.6)
	A reaction: DeRose emphasises that 'a little more' is needed, rather than none. The example given is where 'he knew that p' means little more than 'the information that p was available to him' (in a political scandal).

19516	Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
	Full Idea: While skepticism has drawn much of the attention of contextualists, support for contextualism should also - and perhaps primarily - be looked for in how 'knows' is utilised in non-philosophical conversation.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1016)
	A reaction: Contextualists say scepticism is just raising the standards absurdly high. I take it that the ordinary use of the word 'know' is obviously highly contextual, and so varied that I don't see how philosophers could 'regiment' it into invariant form.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism

19511	If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
	Full Idea: Maybe contextualism isn't a theory about knowledge at all, but about knowledge attributions. As such, it is not a piece of epistemology at all, but of philosophy of language.
	From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.7)
	A reaction: DeRose takes this view to be wrong. At the very least this will have to include self-attributions, by the supposed knower, because I might say 'I know that p', meaning 'but only in this rather low-standard context'.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One

6406	Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
	Full Idea: Reality is one. It must be simple because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity.
	From: F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893], p.519), quoted by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This argument depends on a belief in 'internal' relations, which Russell famously attacked. If an internal feature of every separate item was its relation to other things, then I suppose Bradley would be right. But it isn't, and he isn't.