16 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model') | |
| A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement. |
| 3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change. |
| 3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1) |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R') | |
| A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe. |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might') | |
| A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints. |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have. |
| 3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7) | |
| A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead. |
| 3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
| A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything? |
| 3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events. |
| 3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6) | |
| A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834. |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is') | |
| A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain. |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families]. | |
| From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc') | |
| A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
| 3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect. | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4) |
| 3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
| Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system). | |
| From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |