16 ideas
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
Full Idea: Shadows are distinct from the physical objects casting the shadows and irreducible to them; any attempt at reduction would be incoherent, as it would entail identifying a shadow with the object of which it is a shadow. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: Another failure to find a decent analogy for what is claimed in property dualism. A 'shadow' is a reification of the abstract concept of an absence of light. Objects lose their shadows at dusk, but the object itself doesn't change. |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The word 'ontology' is derived from the Greek word 'ontia', which means 'things which exist'. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.1) |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The argument from analogy makes it impossible to check my inductive inferences because of the privacy of other minds; it also seems irresponsible to generalise from a single case; and it seems like a case of human chauvinism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Privacy of other minds need not imply scepticism about them. I'm a believer, so I have no trouble checking my theories. Solipsists can't 'check' anything. It isn't 'irresponsible' to generalise from one case if that is all you have. |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If I am my brain this leads to the odd result that you have never met me because you have never seen my brain. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 10.7) | |
A reaction: 'Star Trek' is full of aliens who appear beautiful, and turn out to be ugly grey lumps. 'I am my face' would be just as odd, particularly if I were in a coma, or dead. |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
Full Idea: I may be the final authority on whether my shoe pinches, but I am manifestly not the final authority on whether I understand some mathematical theorem. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: However, it doesn't follow that his teachers are the final authority either, because he may get correct answers by an algorithm, and bluff his way when demonstrating his understanding. Who knows whether anyone really understands anything? |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
Full Idea: If mental events are causally efficacious only by virtue of their physical features and not their mental ones, …then anomalous monism leads straight to ephiphenomenalism. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.6) | |
A reaction: As epiphenomenalism strikes me as being incoherent (see Idea 7379), what this amounts to is that either mental effects are causally efficacious, or they are not worth mentioning. I take them to be causally efficacious because they are brain events. |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
Full Idea: In token-identity mental and physical features seem as unrelated as colour and shape, which is very weak physicalism because it does not allow physical states an explanatory role in accounting for mental states. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 3.8.6) | |
A reaction: Colour and shape are not totally unrelated, as they can both be totally explained by a full knowledge of the physical substance involved. ...But maybe if we fully understood Spinoza's single substance...? See Idea 4834. |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth - a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.132) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether we can define meaning if we assume truth, or if we can define truth by assuming meaning. Tarski seems to presuppose meaning when he defines truth (Idea 2345). I like Davidson's taking of truth as basic. |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137) | |
A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good. |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The essential question is whether reference is the, or at least one, place where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions, or objects described in nonlinguistic terms. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.134) | |
A reaction: How do you 'describe objects in nonlinguistic terms'? The causal theory of reference (e.g. Idea 4957) is designed to plug language straight into the world via reference. It simplifies things nicely, but I don't quite believe it. |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: I defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of language. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.136) | |
A reaction: He proposes to connect language to the world via the concept of truth, rather than of reference. It is a brilliant idea, and is the key issue in philosophy of language. I go back to animals, which seem to care about situations rather than things. |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is inconceivable that one should be able to explain the relationship between 'Kilimanjiro' and Kilimanjiro without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; hence there is no chance of explaining reference directly in nonlinguistic terms. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.135) | |
A reaction: I point at the mountain, and a local says 'Kilimanjiro'? There is a 'gavagai'-type problem with that. The prior question might be 'what is it about this word that enables it to have a role in sentences?' Unlike whimpering or belching. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
Full Idea: The principle of nomological causality says that if two events are intrinsically causally related, there must be a strict physical law under which they can be subsumed. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Deductive-nomological' explanation consists of two premises - a strict law with no exceptions and supporting deterministic counterfactuals, and a statement of an event which falls under the law - which together logically require the effect. | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.4) |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
Full Idea: 'Strict' laws of nature contain no ceteris paribus clauses ('all things being equal'), and are part of a closed system (so that whatever affects the system must be included within the system). | |
From: Keith T. Maslin (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2001], 7.5) |