Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Senses of Essence' and 'The Analysis of Matter'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If each object has a unique essence or definition, this may be identified with either the class of properties that it essentially has, or with the class of propositions that are true in virtue of what it is.
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §8)
     A reaction: Elsewhere Fine says that it is easier to work with the propositions view, but that the properties (or predicates) view is probably more fundamental. He goes on here to raise the question of whether either view makes the essence unique.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The nature of the logical concepts is given, not by certain logical truths, but by certain logical inferences. What properly belongs to disjunction is the inference from p to (p or q), rather than the fact that p implies (p or q).
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
     A reaction: Does this mean that Fine is wickedly starting with the psychology, rather than with the pure truth of the connection? Frege is shuddering. This view seems to imply that the truth table for 'or' is secondary.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: According to the principle of Property Abstraction, there is, for any suitable condition, a property that is possessed by an object just in case it conforms to the condition. This is usually taken to be a second-order logical truth.
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §4)
     A reaction: Fine objects that it is implied that if Socrates is essentially a man, then he essentially has the property of being a man. Like Fine, I think this conclusion is distasteful. A classification is not a property, at least the way most people use 'property'.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: One wants to define a logical truth as one that is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts.
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
     A reaction: This is part of Fine's project to give a revised account of essence, which includes the essence of concepts as well as the essence of objects. Everyone should pay close attention to this project.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
6402 In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: In his 'Analysis of Matter' (1927), Russell sought to analyse the chief concepts of physics, such as force and matter, in terms of events.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: My immediate reaction is that this is not very promising, simply because we can always ask why a particular event occurred, and this seems to point to a deeper level in the analysis. See Idea 4779, for example.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14732 A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
     Full Idea: The physical object, as inferred from perception, is a group of events arranged about a centre.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23)
     A reaction: At least I like the active aspect of this definition. You then have to explain what an event is, without mentioning objects. You'd better no mention properties either, since they will probably depend on the dreaded objects.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
     Full Idea: There may be a substance at the centre of an object, but is no reason to think so, since the group of events making up the object will produce exactly the same percepts; so the substance, if there is one, is an abstract possibility irrelevant to science.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23)
     A reaction: All empiricists (as Russell is in this passage) seem to neglect inference to the best explanation. Things can be indirectly testable, and I would say that there are genuine general entities which are too close to abstraction to ever be testable.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Can the essence of an object (ineliminably) involve that object itself (perhaps through self-identity, giving a direct circularity), or have an indirect circularity involving two or more objects (such as admiration between Watson and Holmes).
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §7)
     A reaction: [compressed] This looks like one of the basic questions which any theory of essentialism must address.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If we distinguish 'constitutive' from 'consequential' essence, ..then the essence of Socrates will, in part, be constituted by his being a man. But being a man (or a mountain) will merely be consequential upon, and not constitutive of, his essence.
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
     A reaction: Yes yes yes. I think it is absurd to say that the class to which something belongs is part of its essential nature, given that it presumably can only belong to the class if it already has a certain essential nature. What did Frankenstein construct?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: If there are alternative definitions for an essence, we must distinguish three notions. There is the essence as the manifold (the combined definitions), or as the range of alternative definitions (with component essences), or there is the common essence.
     From: Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §8)
     A reaction: Fine opts for the third alternative (what the definitions all have in common) as the best account. He says (p.68) 'definitive' properties come from one definition, and 'essential' properties from every possible definition.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6418 Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3
     A reaction: This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
21706 At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: In the beginning Russell's ontology included matter as basic, to be known, however, only by inference from sense-data. By the end he wanted to 'contruct' matter from sense-data.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1
     A reaction: [see also p.133] Russell always seems to have been a robust realist about the external world, but the later view seems a lot less realist than the earlier view.