Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Problem of Possibilia' and 'The Intentionality of Sensation'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

9212	Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
	From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
	A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

9213	The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
	From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
	A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

7439	The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
	From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
	A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').