9216
|
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
The three sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order, and the normative order - have their own peculiar forms of necessity. The three main areas of human enquiry - metaphysics, science and ethics - each has its own necessity.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
|
|
A reaction:
I would treat necessity in ethics with caution, if it is not reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Fine's proposal is interesting, but I did not find it convincing, especially in its view that metaphysical necessity doesn't intrude into nature.
|
7903
|
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
|
|
Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
|
|
From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
|
|
A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
|
8364
|
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
|
|
A reaction:
Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.
|
8360
|
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
[very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?
|
8365
|
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
|
|
Full Idea:
Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
|
|
From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
|
|
A reaction:
An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.
|
9215
|
Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
|
|
From:
Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
|
|
A reaction:
I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.
|