37 ideas
2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73) | |
A reaction: [Idea of Varro] Just as unreliable witnesses are the bane of a murder enquiry, so bad philosophers throw a cloud of obscurity roundphilosophy. If 9999 people thought 2+2=4, but there is always one who thinks something different. |
2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Perhaps notions of necessary and sufficient conditions, and counterfactual considerations, are in some way grounded in awareness of ourselves as active interveners and experimenters in the world, not passive spectators. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.155) |
2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I cannot think of a single philosophically interesting concept that has been successfully and nontrivially analysed to most people's satisfaction. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.121) |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal? |
2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Do the statements 'Sir Percy Blakeney is in Paris' and 'The Scarlet Pimpernel is in Paris' express different facts, or the same fact under different modes of presentation? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.129) |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Just as we recognise different levels of reality, so we should recognise different levels of existence. Each object will exist at the lowest level at which it can enjoy its characteristic form of life. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
A reaction: I'm struggling with this claim, despite my sympathy for much of Fine's picture. I'm not sure that the so-called 'levels' of reality have different degrees of reality. |
2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is one thing to see a building, and another to see it as a building, and yet another to see it as Buckingham Palace. How does the commonsense realist think that this is accomplished? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.302) |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
A reaction: For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'. |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07) | |
A reaction: Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it. |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is natural to suggest that to be a man is to have certain kind of temporal-modal profile. ...but it seems natural that being a man accounts for the profile, ...so one should not appeal to an object's modal features in stating what the object is. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a correct and very helpful point, as I am tempted to think that the modal dispositions of a thing are intrinsic to its identity. If we accept 'powers', must they be modal in character? Fine backs a sortal approach. That's ideology. |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The identity of an object - what it is - is not a worldly matter; essence will precede existence in that the identity of an object may be fixed by its unworldly features even before any question of its existence or other worldly features is considered. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear how this cashes out. If I remove the 'worldly features' of an object, what is there left which establishes identity? Fine carefully avoids talk of 'a priori' knowledge of identity. |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is the core essential features of the object that will be independent of how things turn out, and they will be independent in the sense of holding regardless of circumstances, not whatever the circumstances. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
A reaction: The distinction at the end seems to be that 'regardless' pays no attention to circumstances, whereas 'whatever' pays attention to all circumstances. In other words, essence has no relationship to how things are. Plausible. Nice to see 'core'. |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The existential identity of an object with itself needs analysis into two components, one the neutral identity of the object with itself, and the other its existence. The existence of the object appears to be merely a gratuitous addition to its identity. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
A reaction: This is at least a step towards clarification of the notion, which might be seen as just a way of asserting that something 'has an identity'. Fine likes the modern Fregean way of expressing this, as an equality relation. |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If there were impossible objects, ones that do not possibly exist, we would have no difficulty in understanding what it is for such objects to be identical or distinct than in the case of possible objects. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
A reaction: Thus, a 'circular square' seems to be the same as a 'square circle'. Fine is arguing for identity to be independent of any questions of existence. |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We distinguish between the necessary truths proper, those that hold whatever the circumstances, and the transcendent truths, those that hold regardless of the circumstances. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine's project seems to be dividing the necessities which derive from essence from the necessities which tended to be branded in essentialist discussions as 'trivial'. |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is of the nature of Socrates to be a man; and from this it appears to follow that necessarily he is a man. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 04) | |
A reaction: I'm always puzzled by this line of thought, because it is only the intrinsic nature of beings like Socrates which decides in the first place what a 'man' is. How can something help to create a category, and then necessarily belong to that category? |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: An alternative conception of a possible world says it is constituted, not by the totality of facts, or of how things might be, but by the totality of circumstances, or how things might turn out. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
A reaction: The general idea is to make a possible world more limited than in Idea 15068. It only contains properties arising from 'engagement with the world', and won't include timeless sentences. It is a bunch of possibilities, not of actualities? |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We are accustomed think of the actual world as the totality of facts, and so we think of any possible world as being like the actual world in settling the truth-value of every single proposition. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
A reaction: Hence it is normal to refer to a possible world as a 'maximal' set of of propositions (sentences, etc). See Idea 15069 for his proposed alternative view. |
2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Dogs surely have beliefs, and beliefs call for some concepts or other. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.312) |
2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Empiricism is not just a theory of knowledge; it is also a theory meaning. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.149) |
2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Commonsense realism has to account for the subjective similarity of the genuine perception of a green surface and the experience of, say, an after-image. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.142) |
2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is estimated by Gierer (1988) that the human cerebral cortex alone contains about 300,000,000,000,000 synaptic junctions. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.46) | |
A reaction: As we grasp the vastness of this number, and the fact that the junctions are all active, the idea that a brain does something astonishing is not quite so surprising. |
2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Anyone who thinks phenomenal qualities are inseparable from our awareness of them, must think subconscious mental states are totally devoid of phenomenal qualities! So how can these states cause behaviour in the way conscious states do? | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.166) | |
A reaction: I agree with this thought, though it is beautifully unprovable. We would need to respond to a red traffic light, without having consciously registered its presence. It is is just increasingly clear that we register information pre-consciously. |
2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I cannot make intuitive sense of there existing a being who possessed genuine beliefs and desires, but who, or which, lacked the capacity for consciousness altogether. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.44) | |
A reaction: This is part of the recent move (which strikes me as correct) to see qualia and intentionality as inseparable. We might well, though, need to adopt the 'intentional stance' to a sophisticated robot. But am I aware of all of my beliefs? |
2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If one asks 'what does the world look like to a fish?' the answer may be 'it doesn't look like anything; fish find their way about by blindsight.' | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.56) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a real possibility, not just a wild speculation. It seems pretty obvious to me that I operate by blindsight in many aspects of my behaviour. Piano-playing would be impossible if all qualia had to be processed. |
2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: I am suggesting that introspective psychology might have a contribution to make to fundamental physics. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.176) | |
A reaction: I'm a fan of introspection, as a source of genuine information. |
2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Halting the slide into panpsychism is the major advantage of holding that phenomenal qualities can exist unsensed. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.170) | |
A reaction: Presumably unsensed phenomenal qualities would explain the discovery that we seem to make decisions before we are conscious of what we intend to do. That result certainly implied that consciousness had no real function. |
2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If we assume that mental events are located in time, then it follows immediately, given special relativity, that they are also in space. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73) | |
A reaction: A powerful point. Of course, there might (you never know) be something which exists in time but not space (and thoughts clearly exist in time), but (as in Hume's argument against miracles), dualism will overthrow your other basic beliefs about nature. |
2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Philosophical behaviourism is an absurd theory. Practically the only philosophers who ever held it, at any rate in its crude form, were certain logical positivists. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.25) | |
A reaction: I presume Lockwood's target here is eliminativist behaviourism, as opposed to methodological behaviourism (which is a reasonable practice to adopt), and 'black box' behaviourism (which has been superseded by functionalism). |
2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: A favourite example of identity theorists is the identification of flashes of lightning with electrical discharges. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.71) | |
A reaction: Personally I prefer the analogy of the mind being like a waterfall - a non-mysterious physical process which has dramatic properties of its own. If minds must keep busy in order to be minds, they must be processes. |
2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: If the logical positivists established anything it is that there is no way of demarcating science from metaphysics. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.313) | |
A reaction: So many problems arise for philosophers because of the passion for 'demarcating' things. Close study, experiments, statistics and measurements occur in every walk of life. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: It is tempting to see the concept of causation as a product of reason rather than of perception or introspection; something that reason brings to bear on the data of sense, by way of imposing an explanatory order on them. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.154) |
2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: Somehow we have got it into our heads that time itself is a process of change. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.12) |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is said that there is no room in the A-theorists' ontology for a realm of timeless existents. Just as there is a tendency to think that every sentence is tensed, so there is a tendency to think that every object must enjoy a tensed form of existence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
A reaction: Fine is arguing for certain things to exist or be true independently of time (such as arithmetic, or essential identities). I struggle with the notion of timeless existence. |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Most A-theorists have been inclined to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is because they reject the notion of 'tenseless' truths. But sentences like 'two and two make four' seem not to be very tensy. |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: B-theorists regard tensed sentences as incomplete expressions, implicitly containing an unfilled argument-place for the time at which they are to be evaluated. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
A reaction: To distinguish past from future it looks as if you would need two argument-places, not one. Then there are 'used to be' and 'had been' to evaluate. |