16 ideas
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We understand a defined object (what it is) through the objects on which it depends. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
A reaction: This places dependency relations right at the heart of our understanding of the world, and hence shifts traditional metaphysics away from existence and identity. The notion of explanation is missing from Fine's account. |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics has two main areas of concern: one is with the nature of things, with what they are; and the other is with the existence of things, with whether they are. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
A reaction: This paper is part of a movement which has shifted metaphysics to a third target - how things relate to one another. The possibility that this third aim should be the main one seems quite plausible to me. |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In Wooster as the witless bachelor and Jeeves as the crafty manservant, and one valet to the other, we will have the counterpart, within the framework of real definition, to the simultaneous definition of two terms. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
A reaction: This is wonderful grist to the mill of scientific essentialism, which endeavours to produce an understanding through explanation of the complex interactions of nature. |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It seems wrong to identify the 'being' of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect existence is too weak; for there is more to an object than mere existence; also too strong, for an object's nature need not include existence. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
A reaction: The word 'being' has been shockingly woolly, from Parmenides to Heidegger, but if you identify it with a thing's 'nature' that strikes me as much clearer (even if a little misty). |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: An object 'weakly' depends upon another if it is ineliminably involved in one of its definitions; and it 'strongly' depends upon the other if it is ineliminably involved in all of its definitions. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
A reaction: It is important to remember that a definition can be very long, and not just what might go into a dictionary. |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A natural account of dependence in terms of modality and existence is that one thing x will depend on another thing y just in case it is necessary that y exists if x exists (or in the symbolism of modal logic, □(Ex→Ey). | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
A reaction: He is going to criticise this view (which he traces back to Aristotle and Husserl). It immediately seems possible that there might be counterexamples. x might depend on y, but not necessarily depend on y. Necessities may not produce dependence. |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The objects upon which a given object depends, according to the present account, are those which must figure in any of the logically equivalent definitions of the object. They will, in a sense, be ineliminable. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
A reaction: This is Fine's main proposal for the dependency relationship, with a context of Aristotelian essences understood as definitions. Sounds pretty good to me. |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The notion of one object depending upon another is the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
A reaction: This begins to fill out the Aristotelian picture very nicely, since definitions are right at the centre of the nature of things (though a much more transitional part of the story than Fine seems to think). |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We should understand the identity or being of an object in terms of the propositions rendered true by its identity rather than the other way round. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I) | |
A reaction: Behind this is an essentialist view of identity, rather than one connected with necessary properties. |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: How and where are we to draw the line between what is basic to the essence and what is derived? | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II) | |
A reaction: He calls the basic essence 'constitutive' and the rest the 'consequential' essence. This question is obviously very challenging for the essentialist. See Idea 22. |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: It is natural to suppose, in the case of such objects as Wooster and Jeeves, that in addition to possessing constitutive essential properties they will also enter into constitutive essential relationships. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
A reaction: I like this. If we are going to have scientific essences as structures of intrinsic powers, then the relationships between the parts of the essence must also be essential. That is the whole point - that the powers dictate the relationships. |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We can say that an object essentially has a certain property if its having that property follows from every definition of the object, while an object will definitively have a given property if its having that property follows from some definition of it. | |
From: Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III) | |
A reaction: Presumably that will be every accurate definition. This nicely allows for the fact that at least nominal definitions may not be unique, and there is even room for real definitions not to be fully determinate (thus, how far should they extend?). |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78) | |
A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases. |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85) | |
A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights. |