Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Completeness of Axioms of Logic' and 'On the Nature of Moral Values'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
     Full Idea: Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63)
     A reaction: I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth.
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 3. Completeness of PC
Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930.
     From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
     Full Idea: Our inductions become increasingly explicit and deliberate, and in the fulness of time we even rise above induction, to the hypothetico-deductive method.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.57)
     A reaction: This seems to defer to Hempel's account of scientific theorising. I wander what exactly 'rising above' means?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
     Full Idea: Altruistic values attach to satisfactions of other persons, without regard to ulterior satisfactions accruing to oneself. Ceremonial values attach to practices of one's society, without regard to satisfactions accruing to oneself.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.58)
     A reaction: An interesting distinction, but probably as blurred and circular as (according to Quine) the analytic/synthetic distinction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]
     Full Idea: One cannot reasonably be called upon to love even one's neighbour quite as oneself. Is love to diminish inversely as the square of the distance? Is it to extend to other species than one's own?
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.65)
     A reaction: Quine isn't actually saying that love is inherently egoistic, but that is the implication. The power of my love is at its most powerful when it is closest to home.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').