89 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The concept of truth was originated by the senses. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.479) | |
| A reaction: This is a refreshing challenge to the modern view of truth, which seems entirely entangled with language. Truth seems a useful concept when discussing the workings of an animal mind. As you get closer to an object, you see it more 'truly'. |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
| A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
| A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
| A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
| A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
| A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
| A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
| A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
| A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
| A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
| A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound. |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: The real Platonic entities left standing after the Theory of Descriptions were propositions (not classes or numbers), and their constituents did not include denoting concepts or classes, but only individuals (Socrates) and universals (mortality). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Propositions look like being the problem here. If we identify them with facts, it is not clear how many facts there are in the universe, independent of human thought. Indeed, how many universals are there? Nay, how many individuals? See Idea 7534. |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view makes it impossible to attribute existence to properties, and this would have to be declared ill-formed and meaningless. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a powerful criticism, used to support McGinn's view that existence cannot be analysed, using quantifiers or anything else. |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell says one won't find the present King of France on the list of bald things, nor on the list of things that are not bald. It would seem that this gives rise to a violation of the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 2 | |
| A reaction: It's a bit hard to accuse the poor old King of violating a law when he doesn't exist. |
| 5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: What can be a surer guide to the distinction of true from false than our own senses? | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.700) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't say they are the only guide, which leaves room for guides such as what is consistent or self-evident or inferred. There is enough here, though, to show that the Epicureans were empiricists in a fairly modern way. |
| 5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The structure of your reasoning must be rickety and defective, if the senses on which it rests are themselves deceptive. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.518) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most basic tenets of empiricism. It denies the existence of 'pure' reason, and instead asserts that it is built out of complex and abstracted sense experience, which makes it ultimately a second-class citizen. |
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
| A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
| 5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
| A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |
| 5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: No fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt at the first presentation. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1022) | |
| A reaction: Hence induction is just 'drumming it in' until you come to believe it. There are good evolutionary reasons why we should be like this, because we would otherwise believe all sorts of silly half-perceptions in the gloaming. |
| 5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The guiding principle of the whole body is the mind or intellect, which is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is felt fear and alarm, and the caressing pulse of joy. Here, then is the seat of the intellect and mind. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.140) | |
| A reaction: Even by this date thinking people were not clear that the mind is in the brain. They paid insufficient attention to head injuries. The emotions are felt to have a location, but intellect and principles are not. |
| 5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: First, I maintain that the mind, which we often call the intellect, the seat of guidance and control of life, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.95) | |
| A reaction: Presumably Lucretius asserts this because some people were denying it. Sounds like common sense to me. The only reason I can see for anyone denying what he says is if they are desperate to survive death. |
| 21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: No single element [of the soul] can be separated, nor can their capacities be divided spatially; they are like the multiple powers of a single body | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.262), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 2.7 | |
| A reaction: It is interesting that this comes from someone with a strongly physicalist view of the mind (though not, if I recall, focusing on the brain). He is still totally impressed by the unified phenomenology of mental experience. He is an empiricist. |
| 5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The fact that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity - this is due to the slight swerve of the atoms at no determinate time or place. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.294) | |
| A reaction: No one likes this proposal much, but it is very intriguing. The Epicureans had seen a problem, one which doesn't bother me much. If, nowadays, you are a reductive physicalist who believes in free will, you have a philosophical nightmare ahead of you. |
| 5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can touch or be touched except body. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.303) | |
| A reaction: This is the key objection to interactionism, and the main reason why the atomists have a thoroughly material view of the mind. It is an induction from a very large number of instances, but the argument is not, of course, conclusive. |
| 5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The earth is and always has been an insentient being. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.658) | |
| A reaction: The fact that Epicurus needs to deny this shows that some idea close to panpsychism must still have been around in his time. He is discussing gods at the time, so maybe pantheism was the view being attacked, but that is a subset of panpsychism. |
| 5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: There is the possibility that particles have senses like those of an animate being as a whole, …but from the fact that we perceive eggs turning into live fledglings, we may infer that sense can be generated from the insentient. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.914) | |
| A reaction: He gives other arguments for his view. The egg example is not a strong argument, but is precisely our puzzle of how consciousness can emerge from the process of evolution, and natural selection makes dualism look unlikely. |
| 5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Mind and spirit are both composed of matter, as we see them propelling limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face, and guiding the whole man - activities which clearly involves touch, which involves matter. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.164) | |
| A reaction: This is the inverse of Descartes' interaction problem, and strikes me as a straightforward common sense truth. However, if you believe in spiritual gods, this gives you a model for the interaction (however mysterious) of matter and spirit. |
| 5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Why are lions ferocious, foxes crafty, and deer timid? It can only be because the mind always shares in the specific growth of the body according to its seed and breed. If it were immortal and reincarnated, living things would have jumbled characters. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.743) | |
| A reaction: A nice argument which I have not encountered in modern times. Of course, even Descartes admits that the mind is intermingled with the body, but it seems that the essential character of a mind is dictated by the body. |
| 5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless? | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988) | |
| A reaction: Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point. |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this. Presumably phrases which appear to refer actually point at other parts of language rather than the world. |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: If I am right, referring is not the same as denoting and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognised on Russell's view. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Keith Donnellan - Reference and Definite Descriptions §I | |
| A reaction: This introduces a new theory of reference, which goes beyond the mere contents of linguistic experessions. It says reference is an 'external' and 'causal' affair, and so a definite description is not sufficient to make a reference. |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2 | |
| A reaction: [Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it. |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.43) | |
| A reaction: This is the important idea that the sentence is the basic unit of meaning, rather than the word. I'm not convinced that this dispute needs to be settled. Words are pretty pointless outside of propositions, and propositions are impossible without words. |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.46) | |
| A reaction: This shows Russell picking up Frege's famous distinction, as shown in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. To distinguish the meaning from the reference was one of the greatest (and simplest) clarifications ever offered of how language works. |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell, since he eliminates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 04 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we can eliminate sense from formal languages, but natural languages are rich in connotations (or whatever we choose to call them). |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell assumes that it is expressions which refer if anything does, but strictly speaking it is WE who refer with the use of expressions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds right. Russell is part of the overemphasis on language which plagued philosophy after Frege. Words are tools, like searchlights or pointing fingers. |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses'). |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell does not claim that Frege's notion of sense is incoherent, but rather that it is superfluous. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
| A reaction: My initial reaction to this is that the notion of strict and literal meaning (see Idea 7309) is incredibly useful. Some of the best jokes depend on the gap between implications and strict meaning. How could metaphors be explained without it? |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions proceeds by sketching the truth conditions of sentences containing descriptions, and arguing on various grounds that they are the correct truth conditions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: It seems important to see both where Russell was going, and where Davidson has come from. The whole project of finding the logical form of sentences (which starts with Frege and Russell) implies that truth conditions is what matters. |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless. |
| 6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: What is food to one may be literally poison to others. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.638) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the well-known saying. This is not relativism of perception, but a relativism of how individuals actually respond to the world. It sums up the position with, say, the operas of Wagner. |
| 5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in our bodies was born in order that we might be able to use it, but the thing born creates the use. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.834) | |
| A reaction: This remark (strongly opposed to Aristotle's view of human function and nature) raises the obvious question of why the body is so very useful for staying alive. Most of its uses are not random. Lucretius would abandon this view if he read Darwin. |
| 5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.867) | |
| A reaction: There is a special kind of pain in being poor if you were once rich, which is not suffered by those who experience only poverty. Lucretius is right, but we are concerned with how we feel now, not with how we won't feel once dead. |
| 5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Nature only clamours for two things, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensation. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.21) | |
| A reaction: I can't help agreeing with those (like Aristotle) who consider this a very demeaning view of human life. See Idea 99. Bentham agrees with Lucretius (Idea 3777). I think they are largely right, but not entirely. Other motives are possible than sensations. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Nature is free and uncontrolled by proud masters and runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1094) | |
| A reaction: A nice remark. This apparent personification of nature implies the application of laws to an essentially passive reality. See Idea 5442 and Nature|Laws of Nature|Essentialism for a different view. |
| 5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: There can be no centre in infinity. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.1069) | |
| A reaction: This is highly significant, because if we can establish that the universe is infinite (as Epicurus believes), it follows that the human race cannot be at the centre of it, as the Ptolemaic/medieval view proposed. |
| 5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The universe is not bounded in any direction. If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere, but a thing cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.959) | |
| A reaction: This is a subtler argument than the mere enquiry about why you would have to stop at the end of the universe. It still seems a nice argument, though Einstein's curvature of space seems to have thwarted it. |
| 5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate realities of heaven and the gods are the atoms, from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them, and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.46) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right to me. Nothing in modern particle theory and string theory has refuted this claim. But what makes the atoms move, and what makes them combine in an orderly way? Is the orderliness of atoms made of atoms? Essences? |
| 5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: If there are no atoms, the smallest bodies will have infinite parts, since they can be endlessly halved. ..But then there will be no difference between the smallest thing and the whole universe, as they will equally have infinite parts. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.620) | |
| A reaction: Another argument which remains effective even now. There must surely (intuitively) be more divisions possible in a large object than in a small one? Unless of course there were many different sizes of infinity…. See Cantor. |
| 5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: When atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.217) | |
| A reaction: Never a popular theory because it seems to breach the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Ideas 306 + 3646). This seems to be the beginning of a strong need for the concept of free will, and an underlying explanation. Most thinkers put mind outside nature. |
| 17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Nothing has power to break the binding laws of eternity. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], 5.56) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be virtually the only remark from the ancient world suggesting that there are 'laws' of nature, so I'm guessing it is a transient metaphor, not a theory about nature. 'Even the gods must bow to necessity'. |
| 5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: We see movement everywhere, but if there were no empty space, things would be denied the power of movement - or rather, they could not possibly have come into existence, embedded as they would have been in motionless matter. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.342) | |
| A reaction: This still seems a good argument, if reality is made of particles. People can move in a crowd until it becomes too dense. |
| 5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Atoms move themselves. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.133) | |
| A reaction: Something has to move itself, I suppose, but then that could be psuché, giving us free will (see Idea 1424). Why does Epicurus need the 'swerve' if atoms are self-movers? See Idea 5708. |
| 5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Anything can be more speedily disintegrated than put together again. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.558) | |
| A reaction: Clearly the concept of entropy was around long before anyone tried to give a systematic or mathematical account of it. |
| 5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: It must not be claimed that anyone can sense time by itself apart from the movement of things or their restful immobility. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.465) | |
| A reaction: This seems a remarkably Einsteinian remark, though he is only talking of the epistemology of the matter, not the ontology. We are not far from the concept of space-time here. |
| 5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: It is in the highest degree unlikely that this earth and sky is the only one to have been created. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1057) | |
| A reaction: I can only admire the science fiction imagination of this, which roughly agrees with the assessment of modern cosmologists. We think imagination was cramped in the ancient world, and now wanders free - but that is not so. |
| 5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: In studying the workings of nature, our starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.152) | |
| A reaction: This claim seems to cry out for a bit of empiricist caution. What observation has convinced Lucretius that creation out of nothing is impossible? The early Christians switched to the view that divine creation is 'ex nihilo' - out of nothing. |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists' fails as a proof because there is no proof of the first premiss. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.54) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern move of saying that existence (which is 'not a predicate', according to Kant) is actually a quantifier, which isolates the existence claim being made about a variable with a bunch of predicates. McGinn denies Russell's claim. |
| 5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: If the matter in things had not been everlasting, everything by now would have gone back to nothing, and the things we see would be the product of rebirth out of nothing. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.544) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 1431, which is Aquinas's Third Way of proving God. Aquinas thinks there must be a necessary being outside of the system, but Lucretius thinks there must be some necessary existence within the system (as Hume had suggested). |
| 5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The universe was certainly not created for us by divine power: it is so full of imperfections. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.180) | |
| A reaction: This is certainly a problem if God is 'supremely perfect', as Descartes proposed, because then the universe would also have to be supremely perfect. See Idea 2114 for a possible answer from Leibniz. Hume agrees with Epicurus about design. |
| 5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: The nature of deity is to enjoy immortal existence in utter tranquillity, aloof and detached from our affairs. It is free from all pain and peril, strong in its own resources, exempt from any need of us, indifferent to our merits and immune from anger. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.652) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the seed of late seventeenth century deism - the idea of a Creator who is now absent, and ignores our prayers. At that time 'Epicurean' became a synonym for atheist, but Epicureans never quite reached that point. |
| 5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Why does Jupiter never hurl his thunderbolt upon the earth and let loose his thunder out of a sky that is wholly blue? | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], VI.400) | |
| A reaction: Nice question! It really doesn't take very much to see through superstition, and the fact that most people believed such things shows how staggeringly uncritical they were in their thinking, until philosophers appeared and taught them how to reason. |
| 5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Spirit is mortal. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.542) | |
| A reaction: This is asserted at an historical moment when immortality is beginning to grip everyone's imagination. |
| 5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: If spirit is immortal and can remain sentient when divorced from our body, we must credit it with possession of five senses; but eyes or nostrils or hand or tongue or ears cannot be attached to a disembodied spirit. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.624) | |
| A reaction: This is a powerful argument against immortality. If you are going to see, you must interact with photons; to hear you must respond to compression waves; to smell you must react to certain molecules. Immortality without those would be a bit dull. |
| 5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: It is crazy to couple a mortal object with an eternal and suppose that they can work in harmony and mutually interact. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.799) | |
| A reaction: An interesting thought, though not a terrible persuasive argument. A god would indeed be a bit restless if it were chained to a human being, but it would presumably knuckle down to the task if firmly instructed to do it by Zeus. |
| 5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: Since the substance of the mind is extraordinarily mobile, it must consist of particles exceptionally small and smooth and round, ..so that, when the spirit has escaped from the body, the outside of the limbs appears intact and there is no loss of weight. | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.201) | |
| A reaction: Lucretius is wonderfully attentive to interesting evidence. He goes on to compare it to the evaporation of perfume. The fine-grained connections of the brain are not far off what he is proposing. |
| 5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |
| Full Idea: If the spirit is by nature immortal and is slipped into the body at birth, why do we retain no memory of an earlier existence, no impress of antecedent events? | |
| From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.670) | |
| A reaction: Plato took the view that we do recall previous existence, as seen in our innate ideas. This problem forced the Christian church into the uncomfortable claim that God creates the soul at conception, but that it then goes on to immortality. |