Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Fragments on My Philosophical Development' and 'Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags)'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
     Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people.
     From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b
     A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: There is only one evil - egoism; there is only one good - love. ...Love, but truly! All other virtues will automatically come to you.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Fragments on My Philosophical Development [1839], 1834-6)
     A reaction: This is a rather Christian idea of virtue, coming from the great atheist. Does tough love come from love?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').