13 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Every philosophy originates as a manifestation of its time; its origin presupposes its historical time. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.59) | |
A reaction: There seems to be widespread agreement among continental philosophers about this idea, whereas analytic philosophers largely ignore, and treat Plato as if he were a current professor in Chicago. |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Plato in writing is only a means for me; that which is primary and a priori, that which is the ground to which all is ultimately referred, is understanding. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.63) | |
A reaction: It always seems to that the main aim of philosophy is understanding - which is why its central activity is explanation. |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: A thinker is a dialectician only insofar as he is his own opponent. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
A reaction: Quite an inspirational slogan for beginners in philosophy. How many non-philosophers are willing to be their own opponent. In law courts and the House of Commons we assign the roles to separate persons. Hence rhetoric replaces reason? |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: Every intellectual determination has its antithesis, its contradiction. Truth exists not in unity with, but in refutation of its opposite. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.72) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of the 'synthesis' in Hegel, in favour of what strikes me as a rather more sensible interpretation of the modern dialectic. Being exists in contrast to nothingness, and truth exists in contrast to its negation? |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: The urge to communicate is a fundamental urge - the urge for truth. ...That which is true belongs neither to me nor exclusively to you, but is common to all. The thought in which 'I' and 'You' are united is a true thought. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.65) | |
A reaction: Sceptics may doubt that there are such truths, but this is certainly how we experience agreement - that there is some truth shared between us which is no longer the possession of either of us. Nice idea. |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model') | |
A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement. |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R') | |
A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe. |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: To sensuous consciousness it is precisely language that is unreal, nothing. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.77) | |
A reaction: Offered as a corrective to the view that our ontological commitments entirely concern what we are willing to say. |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might') | |
A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints. |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
Full Idea: The Absolute is spirit and nature. ...But what then is the Absolute? Nothing other than this 'and', that is, the unity of spirit and nature. | |
From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.82) | |
A reaction: This is Feuerbach's spin on Hegel. He has been outlining idealist philosophy and the philosophy of nature in Schelling. Is this Spinoza's one substance? |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is') | |
A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain. |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families]. | |
From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc') | |
A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |