Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity'' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori, and not from the order of the phenomena alone. ... For the senses put nothing forward concerning metaphysical matters.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Nice instance of the aspirations of big metaphysics, before Kant cut it down to size. The claim is not far off Plato's, that by dialectic we can work out the necessities of the Forms, to which even the gods must bow. Are necessities really kept from us?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If that substantial chain [vinculum substantiale] for monads did not exist, all bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phenomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, continual dreams perfectly in agreement.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: [The first appearance, apparently, of the 'susbtantial chain' in his writings] I take this to be a hugely significant move, either a defeat for monads, or the arrival of common sense. Spiritual monads must unify things, so they can't just be 'parallel'.
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Monads do not constitute a complete composite substance, since they make up, not something one per se, but only a mere aggregate, unless some substantial chain is added.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.05.26)
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement in the Des Bosses letters of the need for something extra to unite monads. Since the main role of monads was to replace substances, which are only postulated to provide unity, this is rather a climb-down.
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Monads aren't a principle of operation for things outside of themselves.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This is why Leibniz has got into a tangle, and is proposing his 'substantial chain' to join the monads together. I suspect that he would have dumped monads if he had lived a bit longer.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not say there is a chain midway between matter and form, but that the substantial form and primary matter of the composite, in the Scholastic sense (the primitive power, active and passive) are in the chain, and in the essence of the composite.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Note that this implies an essence of primitive power, and not just a collection of all properties. This is the clearest account in these letters of the nature of the 'substantial chain' he has added to his monads.
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The first entelechy of a composite is a constitutive part of the composite substance, namely its primitive force.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: For me, Leibniz's most interesting proposal is to characterise Aristotelian 'form' as an active thing, which offers an intrinsic account of movement, and a bottom level for explanations. There always remains the inexplicable. Why anything? Why this?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Important relations are duration (order of successive things) and position (order of coexisting things) and interaction. Position without a thing mediating is presence. Beyond these is connection when things move one another. Thus things seem to be one.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the best account I can find of his epistemological angle on the unity of things. They are symptoms of the inner power of unification, and he says that God sees these relations most clearly.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
12776 Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every substance is alive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1712.02.05)
     A reaction: The most charitable interpretation of this is that substances are what have unity, and the best model of unity that we can grasp is the unity of an organism. The less charitable view is that he literally thinks a pebble is 'alive'. Hm.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Some realising thing must bring it about that composite substance contains something substantial besides monads, otherwise composites will be mere phenomena. The scholastics' active and passive powers are the substantial bond I am urging.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.01.13), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9
     A reaction: [compressed] This appears to be a major retreat, in the last year of Leibniz's life, from the full monadology he had espoused. How do monads connect to matter, and thus unify it? He is returning to Aristotelian hylomorphism.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An aggregate, but not a composite substance, is resolved into parts. A composite substance only needs the coming together of parts, but is not essentially constituted by them, otherwise it would be an aggregate.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: The point is that there is more to some things than there mere parts. Only some unifying principle, in addition to the mere parts, bestows a unity. Mereology is a limited activity if it has nothing to say about this issue.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is a reason why not every possible thing exists.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This is the kind of wonderful speculative metaphysical remark that we are not allowed to make any more. Needless to say, he doesn't tell us what the reason is. Overcrowding, perhaps.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In the mutual agreement of perceivers consists the truth of the phenomena.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: This remark is startling close to the 'perspectivism' that crops up in the late notebooks of Nietzsche. Leibniz was keen on relativism in many areas, starting with the nature of space. I personally think Leibniz meant 'knowledge' rather than 'truth'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
19451 When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you?
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
     A reaction: A delightful question, even if it looks like a false dichotomy. I'm not sure what to make of 'me', if my reason can be subtracted from it. Aquinas was one the same wavelength here.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
19450 Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
     A reaction: Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
19448 Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: What constitutes the essential difference between man and animal? The most simple, general, and most widely held answer to this question is consciousness. Consciousness is given only in the case of a being to whom his species ...is an object of thought.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
     A reaction: Rather speculative. Since other species cohabit and breed only with their fellow species members, one might have thought they were aware of them.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
19454 A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: The concept of God depends on the concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom - a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
     A reaction: This is part of Feuerbach's argument for atheism, but if you ask for the source of our human concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom, no one, I would have thought, could cite God for the role.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Miracles should not be increased beyond necessity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Des Bosses [1715], 1716.05.29)
     A reaction: Leibniz defends miracles (where Spinoza dismisses them). This remark is, of course, an echo of Ockham's Razor, that 'entities' should not be multiplied beyond necessity. It is hard to disagree with his proposal. Zero might be result, though.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
19452 The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: God is the manifestation of man's inner nature, his expressed self.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
     A reaction: Even if you are a deeply committed theist, you have to concede some of this point. The perfections attributed to God are usually of human qualities. Leibniz, though, says that God has an infinity of perfection, mostly unknown to us.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
19453 If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and ...their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
     A reaction: It is certainly a struggle for the imagination to grasp a being which is characterised by idealised versions of human virtues, and yet has an intrinsic nature which is utterly different from humanity.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
19449 Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Religion is the consciousness of the infinite.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
19455 Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: What is regarded as atheism today will be religion tomorrow.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
     A reaction: Modern critics of atheism frequently accuse it of being a new religion. I doubt whether Feuerbach is right, but it is a nice provocative idea.