19451
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When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you?
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
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A reaction:
A delightful question, even if it looks like a false dichotomy. I'm not sure what to make of 'me', if my reason can be subtracted from it. Aquinas was one the same wavelength here.
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19450
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Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
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A reaction:
Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival.
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7590
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Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
According to consequentialism, the fundamental concept of morality is not obligation (deontological ethics) but value (axiological ethics).
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'consequentialism')
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A reaction:
These two views could come dramatically apart, in wartime, or in big ecological crises, or in a family breakup, or in religious disputes. Having identified the pair so clearly, why can we not aim for a civilised (virtuous) balance between the two?
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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7589
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Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
Two distinct motives go by the name of altruism: the emotions of liking, love and friendship, making another's interest automatically mine; and the moral motive of respect or considerateness, where another's interests become reasons for me, but not mine.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'altruism')
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A reaction:
The second one has a strongly Kantian flavour, with its notion of impersonal duty. Virtue theorists will aspire to achieve the first state rather than the second, because good actions are then actively desired, and give pleasure to the doer.
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7593
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Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism believes (roughly) in the supremacy of the individual, who has freedom and natural rights; it focuses on human, not divine affairs; it claims rights and duties are universal; and it advocates tolerance in religion and morality.
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From:
report of Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'liberalism') by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
I find it hard to disagree with these principles, but the upshot in practice is often an excessive commitment to freedom and tolerance, because people fail to realise the subtle long-term erosions of society that can result.
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7587
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The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
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Full Idea:
The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated.
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From:
Roger Scruton (A Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], 'abortion')
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A reaction:
This is the legalistic approach to the problem, which always looks for precedents and comparisons. All problems must hav solutions, though (mustn't they?). The problem, though, is not the value of the foetus, but the unique form of 'ownership'.
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19454
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A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
The concept of God depends on the concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom - a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
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A reaction:
This is part of Feuerbach's argument for atheism, but if you ask for the source of our human concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom, no one, I would have thought, could cite God for the role.
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19453
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If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and ...their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
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A reaction:
It is certainly a struggle for the imagination to grasp a being which is characterised by idealised versions of human virtues, and yet has an intrinsic nature which is utterly different from humanity.
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