Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Philosophical Remarks' and 'Nominalism and Realism'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same 'type'.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.41), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §7
     A reaction: A nice statement of the problem. As usual, the question is whether the 'sameness' is a feature of nature, or a product of human thought
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp'
     A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17
     A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr'
     A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').