5893
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A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
The wise man does nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, does everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly, not looking forward to anything as bound to come, is not astonished at any novel occurrence, abides by his own decisions.
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxviii)
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A reaction:
Notice that the wise man never exhibits weakness of will (an Aristotelian virtue), and is consistent (as Kant proposed), and is patient (as the Stoics proposed). But Cicero doesn't think he should busy himself maximising happiness.
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19428
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Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
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A reaction:
I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do.
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5047
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The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139)
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A reaction:
How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'.
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5884
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How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound?
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47)
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A reaction:
This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified.
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5887
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The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union.
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71)
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A reaction:
Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'.
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5886
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Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
The soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet discerns other things.
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvii)
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A reaction:
The soul is a complex item which contributes many layers of interpretation to what it sees, so there is scope for parts of the soul seeing other parts. Somewhere in the middle Cicero seems to be right - there is an elusive something we can't get at.
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5885
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Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
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Full Idea:
No beginnings of souls can be found on earth; there is no combination in souls that could be born from earth, nothing that partakes of moist or airy or fiery; for in those elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, or reflection.
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From:
M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvi.66)
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A reaction:
Interesting, but I think magnetism is an instructive analogy, which has weird properties which we never perceive in elements (though it is there, buried deep - suggesting panpsychism). Cicero would be disconcerted to find that fire isn't an element.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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19429
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The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347)
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A reaction:
This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral.
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