Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Divination ('De divinatione')' and 'The Status of Content'

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3 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
     Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory.
     From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8
     A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127)
     A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').